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Executive summary 
The scope of the Deliverable 6.1 is to introduce the causal qualitative model developed in the context 
of the PERCEIVE project, as a part of the Working Package 6. The report begins with a short introduction 
that highlights the necessity of developing a model for simulating: (i) the manner in which the European 
Cohesion Policy funds are distributed among the regions under study and the factors that affect the related 
absorption, along with the (ii) the diverse streams of communication of the European Cohesion Policy 
projects and outcomes that influence the citizens awareness. The analysis of the system is focused on the 
EU structural funds, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social 
Fund (ESF) during the two previous programming periods (i.e. 2000-2006, 2007-2013). In fact, the multi-
level nature of the system (i.e. EU, regions, beneficiaries), the dynamic behaviour over the programming 
periods, as well as the complexity reflected through the multiple intertwined feedback loops render the 
System Dynamics methodology as the appropriate approach to map and model the system under study. 
Thus, we briefly present the basic elements and procedures of System Dynamics technique. 
Before the analysis of the qualitative model, we present in time graphs all the collected real data that 
capture the behaviour of the regional EU structural funds’ absorption and the related citizens’ awareness. 
The aim of these graphs is to investigate the dynamic properties of the data under study, as well as the 
patterns that occur in different regions (or nations), different programming periods and different EU funds. 
We refer to these time graphs as reference modes since they represent the reference to the problem issue 
we want to address with the simulation study.  
Concerning absorption, we retrieved the data from internal EU communication and reports. In case no 
regional data were available, we used regionalised national data. The regions under study demonstrate 
considerable variations in the absorption efficiency for a specific fund and period, even in the case of regions 
in the same country (e.g. In Italy, Emilia Romagna exhibits a better absorption rate that Calabria). Of course, 
in such a comparison, we need to consider that the amount of funds allocated and, thus, the administrative 
capacity to govern fund allocation, varies considerably among regions.  Investigating each region separately, 
notable disparities are also evident between the programming periods in the same region. In addition, the 
ERDF absorption rates are slightly higher compared with the ESF ones.  
Regarding awareness, we retrieved data from the available EU Eurobarometer reports and the survey 
performed in the context of the PERCEIVE project (i.e. Deliverable 1.2). National awareness exhibits 
different behaviours, mainly constant and decreasing ones, unlike the increasing trend that was 
theoretically expected. Furthermore, the reported figures document significant discrepancies between the 
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different sources of data, probably due to the different nature of the questions asked to the citizens and 
different weights used to ponder the regional and national sample of respondents.    
Focusing on the causal modelling process, the system under study is divided into two subsystems, 
namely: (i) the fund absorption system, and (ii) the general public awareness system. The first system 
describes the mechanisms of EU structural funds management, while the latter focuses on the processes 
that underpin the building of awareness about the EU role in the cohesion policy projects implemented in 
their region. Notably, the two systems are interconnected, as the outputs of the one constitute the inputs of 
the other and vice versa.  
The fund absorption system, which reflects the main flow of European Cohesion Policy funds from the 
EU to the regions, is comprised of four (4) major interrelated feedback loops exist in the system, namely: (i) 
the “local managing authority learning” loop, (ii) the “potential applications” loop, (iii) the “word of mouth” 
loop, and (iv) the “strategies to increase absorption rate” loop. Each loop illustrates a cycle of causal 
relationships, meaning that an initial variable has a circular impact on a sequence of other variables leading 
again to an effect on the initial one. More specifically, loop (i) indicates the local managing authorities’ ability 
to improve skills and increase performance in order to deal with the workload of projects submitted. Loop 
(ii) presents the local managing authorities’ ability (gained from experience from successful projects’ 
implementation) to write high quality calls attracting more potential beneficiaries to apply. Loop (iii) 
represents the process of increasing the number of applicants through the communication of structural 
funds opportunity to potential beneficiaries by the beneficiaries already refunded. Finally, loop (iv) depicts 
the two strategies a local managing authority with a significant absorption gap can implement, either by 
lowering its acceptance standards or by funding projects already funded within the EU framework that are 
easily selectable for additional funds.   
The general public awareness system, which reflects the main streams of information that impact the 
European citizens’ awareness about EU structural funds (i.e. ERDF, ESF). In the context of the PERCEIVE 
project, a person is considered aware if she/he has heard about any EU co-financed project that improves 
the area where they live. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first effort to produce a comprehensive map 
of the factors that influence citizens’ awareness. We analysed four main streams of information that affect 
citizens’ awareness. Namely: (i) the “EU direct” stream, (ii) the “local managing authority” stream, (iii) the 
“media” stream, and (iv) the “funded projects implemented” stream.  More specifically, stream (i) indicates 
the tools EU directly puts in place to inform citizens: EU Direct local agencies and EU media campaigns. 
Stream (ii) reports the efforts made by local managing authorities to inform citizens through media 
campaigns. Stream (iii) takes into consideration all the people that might be informed by media discussions 
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
5 
 
on European Cohesion Policy and the relevant funded projects. In the end, stream (iv) deconstructs the 
whole set of possibilities of projects implemented that can foster awareness of EU role in supporting 
regional development. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1988 reforms of cohesion policies, Yesilkagit and Blom-Hansen suggest (2007: 503-504), brought 
about a turning point by decentralizing decision-making from the Commission to member states and by 
introducing the partnership principle, according to which the planning, decision-making and 
implementation of cohesion policy must be made in close consultation with subnational authorities and 
interest organizations. To ensure that funds of cohesion policy are spent judiciously, institutional, 
governance and behavioural issues need to be addressed. Despite the issue of absorption is still relevant, 
there has been a notable shift in emphasis of discussions within the cohesion policy area away from issues 
of absorption and towards issues of efficiency and effectiveness (McCann, 2015: 69). Our modelling exercise 
addresses the issue of “efficiency and effectiveness” in cohesion fund spending. Specifically, we address 
three challenges. 
First, recent evidence suggests that there are still important governance and distributional issues 
facing the policy that need to be overcome in order to reduce the heterogeneity of the policy impacts at the 
local level and many of these also relate to multi-level governance challenges (McCann, 2015: 69). 
Second, subnational authorities and interest organizations need to collaborate with the Commission 
and national executives in the design and implementation of cohesion policy (Hooghe 1996; Yesilkagit and 
Blom-Hansen, 2007).  
Third, “…regions with better governance performance and a strong administrative capacity also tend 
to be those regions in the richer countries” (McCann, 2015: 69) so that allocating additional funds to poorer 
regions might not lead to an improvement of economic and social problems (Garcilazo and Rodriguez-Pose, 
2013). This feedback between fund allocation, administrative capacity and socioeconomic enhancement 
may trigger a vicious circle in which richer regions have more benefit from fund allocation thereby 
jeopardising the very intent of cohesion policies.  
The three challenges, we believe, call for a research approach able to elicit the web of the many 
interactions among different decision-makers who are located at different levels in the governance process 
of cohesion policies. 
This deliverable reports the map reproducing the key feedback that connect regional, national and EU 
decision-making in cohesion policy. We call this map a feedback model. Despite our feedback model 
connects actors and processes located at different levels of governance, the focus is the web of processes 
and actors located at the level of Local Managing Authorities (LMAs), that is, the organizations that 
administrate the process of allocation of funds.   
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A feedback approach 
We assume that the design and the implementation of policies implies anticipating the consequences 
of the interaction among many variables in the long term. This endeavour requires interpreting the role of 
positive and negative feedbacks, inertia and time delays. In the analysis of EU integration dynamics, for 
example, Fligstein adopted a feedback approach to analyse long-term pressures to Euroscepticism 
(Fligstein, 2008).  
Positive feedback 
In policy-making and resource allocation, positive feedbacks, which take the forms of autocatalytic 
processes and self-fulfilling prophecies, are common and force policy-makers to investigate timing of 
resource allocation. The dynamic interplay of these feedback loops leads to emerging non-linear patterns 
that are not easily amenable to analysis or explanation by the means of conventional research 
methodologies. Computer simulation is appropriate for studying, in vitro, catastrophic process (or historical 
unexpected ‘accidents’ or crises) as the consequences of the working of positive feedbacks.  
In our research, the presence of positive feedback is very important because it generates two key 
features that are relevant for policy-makers: 
 
1) Path-dependency and Historical Inefficiencies 
Actions/decisions produce different consequences depending on the time in history in which decisions 
are conceived of and actions are implemented. The concept of historical inefficiency (Carrol and Harrison 
1994) refers to a social process “…with positive feedback (or self-reinforcement) that can generate 
outcomes that arise from "chance" rather than a systematic force.” 
2) Irreversibility and Hysteresis 
Actions or forces applied to a social system become progressively less effective as the pressure of 
existing positive feedback unfolds. This feature of social systems is particularly frequent and it is 
fundamental to enhance quality of policy-making. In our case, these two features are particularly important 
because they may generate bifurcating patterns among different regions in the capability of managing EU 
funds. The analysis of these long terms dynamics are central to coordinate accordingly communication 
policies. 
 
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
8 
 
Negative feedback 
Differently from positive feedback, negative feedback tend to counteract the jolts that a system 
receives. Typically, negative feedback are at the core of the functioning of such control devices as 
servomechanisms or thermostats. They tend to keep a system towards a specific, desired or planned, state. 
For example, thermostats tend to keep the temperature of a space close to a specific level. In doing so, 
negative feedback mechanisms work to counteract pressures that would change the state of the system 
towards an undesired state. Despite their desirable properties, negative feedback produce undesired 
outcome as well. The most important one is the resistance of systems to policy intervention. This occurs 
when a specific intervention to modify the state of a system is counterbalanced by the reaction of the system 
itself, which, consequently, becomes resilient to policy-makers’ interference. 
Inertia and Accumulation 
The key variables that we consider in our theoretical framework evolve because of accumulation and 
erosion processes that unfold over time. For example, long delays divide resource allocation and policy 
outcomes. This separation in time between decisions, action and consequences has to be considered to 
address the formation of perceptions and identification. Communication policies need to be coordinated 
since it is likely that they are effective in specific windows of time. Using a simulation approach, we would 
like to observe simultaneously the accumulation of delays and time lags and to explore the effects of such 
delays on the effects of policies and communication efforts.   
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2. System dynamics methodology 
To approach, unravel and analyse such a complex system under study, PERCEIVE researchers decided 
to employ System Dynamics (SD) methodology. SD is a simulation-based methodology that provides 
meaningful insights in real-world problems exhibiting dynamic complexity. SD was originally introduced 
by Forrester (1961) as a modelling technique for assisting corporations in understanding the long-term 
impact of management policies. Since then, the SD approach has been extensively applied to several 
problems within the business sector, such as to business policy (e.g. Georgiadis and Besiou, 2008; Aivazidou 
et al., 2018) and to corporate strategy (e.g. Duran-Encalada and Paucar-Caceres, 2012; Sinha et al., 2016). 
In fact, SD has proven to be a very powerful tool for analysing the non-linear behaviour of complex systems 
over time (Sterman, 2000). 
Since the early beginning of its introduction, apart from the business sector, SD has been applied in 
social, economic technological and ecological systems. For instance, Forrester (1969) utilised the SD 
approach to capture the life cycle dynamics of urban growth and decay, considering the city environment 
as a complex system that undergoes drastic changes over time. Another well-known example of SD 
application outside the business environment is the worldwide bestseller Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 
1972), in which a team of researchers studied what could happen to the global population and to the 
environment if development is sustained by uncontrolled use of resources.  Additionally, SD has been also 
used to analyse and to improve our understanding of social systems (Reppening, 2003; Mollona, 2015). 
Such issues as the impact of social change initiatives on society (Hirsch et al., 2007) or the effect of 
workforce policies on a health and social care system (Cave and Willis, 2016) have been addresses with SD.  
In line with these streams of research, the major objective of PERCEIVE Working Package 6 is to 
establish the use of SD methodology for capturing the complex dynamics of social-economic systems related 
to EU Cohesion policy. In fact, although the European funding to the regions through the cohesion policy 
follows a linear pattern, the effects of the local stakeholders’ administrative capacity and the knowledge 
about the funds, as well as that of the projects’ application quality, on the projects’ acceptance rate generate 
non-linear interrelations within the system. Furthermore, taking into consideration the time-dependent 
behaviour of the European funding, the complexity and the dynamics of the problem under study render SD 
the appropriate modelling method for the analysis. 
Following the typical steps of the SD approach, a causal loop (influence) diagram captures the 
conceptual structure of a system in a qualitative manner. A causal loop diagram is a representation of the 
system’s major hypotheses and feedback mechanisms. A feedback is a sequence of causes and effects such 
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as that a change in a given variable circulates through the loop and finally ends up further influencing the 
same variable (Georgiadis and Vlachos, 2004). These mechanisms are rather balancing (negative) or 
reinforcing (positive) feedback loops (Forrester, 1969; Sterman, 2000). If an initial increase in a variable 
leads to an eventual decrease (or increase) in the same variable, then the feedback loop is considered as 
balancing (or reinforcing). Specifically, a balancing feedback loop demonstrates a goal-seeking behaviour 
overtime; after an initial disturbance, the system seeks to return to an equilibrium situation. In a reinforcing 
feedback loop, an initial disturbance causes further change leading to an exponential growth or decay, 
indicating the presence of an unstable equilibrium. Figure 2.1 represents two indicative examples of a 
balancing and a reinforcing loop using the case of population. In fact, an increase in population raises deaths, 
which in turn decrease the population (balancing loop); while, a growth of population increases births, 
which in turn augment population (reinforcing loop).  
 
Figure	2.1. Examples of balancing and reinforcing loops in the population case. 
The second phase of the SD approach is the quantification, that is, the conversion of the causal loop 
diagram into a dynamic simulation model, namely the stock and flow diagram. A stock and flow diagram is 
an elaborate mathematical representation of the system’s structure and the interrelationships among all 
variables. These variables can be stock (i.e. state) and flow (i.e. rate) variables, time delays, auxiliary 
variables and constants (Sterman, 2000). Specifically, stock variables (symbolised by rectangles) are states 
that represent accumulations within the system, while flow variables (symbolised by valves) are rates that 
fill or empty the stock variables (Table 2.1). Mathematically, a SD model constitutes a system of differential 
equations with: (i) integral equations that express the integration of flows into stock variables, and (ii) 
supplementary equations that connect the model’s variables through mathematical functions.  Overall, the 
combination of different and multiple feedback loops, with delays stocks and rates appear to be able to 
describe and reproduce many of systems’ behaviour we can appreciate in our life. 
The behavior of the resulting system of differential equations is numerically analyzed by simulating the 
behavior of a system of difference equations that approximates the behavior of the original system. A variety 
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of simulation software exist to implement the SD approach such as Stella®, Vensim® and Powersim®. In 
the context of the PERCEIVE project, we utilised the Vensim® software for our analysis. 
 
Table	2.1. Symbols of the stock and flow diagram. 
Symbol	 Variable	description	
 
Stock (State) 
 
Flow (Rate) 
 
Auxiliary 
 
Constant 
 Information flow 
 
Delay 
 
After the simulation process, validation follows to control the robustness of the model developed. 
However, while model validation has an important role in any simulation study providing a basis for 
consistency in the outputs (Swisher et al., 2001), it often constitutes a challenging topic that is poorly 
addressed (Bellomo and Gibelli, 2016), limiting the reliability of the provided study outputs. In SD 
methodology, validation tests are divided into two groups, namely the “structural” tests and the “behaviour” 
tests (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Barlas, 1989). Behaviour validity tests check whether the model is capable 
of reproducing an acceptable pattern observed in the analysis while structural validity tests investigate if 
the model is an adequate representation of the real system, namely they assess if the model reproduces the 
desired behaviour overtime for the ‘right reasons’. According to Barlas (1989), a model should pass first the 
structural tests and then the behaviour ones, given that, unless a SD model is structurally sound, it is 
meaningless to test it for pattern prediction ability. All model validation techniques are elaborately 
presented by Forrester and Senge (1980). 
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3. Reference modes 
When adopting a systemic approach for mapping a problem, or a complex environment, a key step is 
to capture the characteristics feature of the system’s behaviour over time. Thus, collecting time series data 
available that capture system’s state over time and plotting this relevant knowledge into time graphs is a 
crucial phase of our analysis. By eliciting recurrent trends and tendencies, this preliminary step is important 
as it allows for the investigation of the distinguishing dynamic properties complex systems. 
To this end, to investigate the robustness of the modelling procedure and the consistency of the 
relevant results, comparisons with the available real-world data is necessary. In the context of PERCEIVE 
project, this approach has been utilized to investigate the European Structural Fund (SF) regional 
absorption, including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund 
(ESF), as well as the related citizens’ awareness. The aforementioned data regarding the regional EU funds 
and the related awareness are explored for nine regions with diverse characteristics in seven EU countries, 
namely: (1) Burgenland, Austria, (2) Calabria, Italy, (3) Emilia-Romagna, Italy, (4) Dolnośląskie, Poland, (5) 
Warmińsko-mazurskie, Poland, (6) Sud-Est, Romania, (7) Extremadura, Spain, (8) Norra Mellansverige, 
Sweden, and (9) Essex, United Kingdom. The funding data are analysed for each region during the latest 
completed programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. The awareness data are provided mainly at a 
national level beginning from 1992 up to 2017 but not in an annual time step. All data are presented 
analytically in tables in the Appendix A. In addition, meaningful insights on the data are discussed on each 
separate subsection. 
3.1. Regional operational plan payments 
In subsection 3.1, real data referring to the regional operational plan (ROP) payments, which are 
directly managed by the local managing authorities (LMAs) of the regions, are presented. We retrieved 
these data were from the official European Union (EU) annual reports for each fund and period (Equey, 
2003-2017)1. The data were meticulously collected and clustered in complete databases for each region, 
presented as time series by fund and period. It should be mentioned that for all ROP data for the first 
programming period, payments begin in 2003 and for some regions finish even eight years after the end of 
the period, namely in 2014. Regarding the second programming period, payments begin in 2007 and may 
finish even in 2018. Notably, for specific regions the funding is still open (please refer to subsection 3.3). 
                                                           
1 It should be noted that the annual EU reports for the evolution of payments of the Structural Funds constitute an internal communication of the 
EU and do not are available publicly on the web. They were sent to the PERCEIVE researchers by EU officers via e-mail communication. 
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the accumulation of the ERDF payments to the regions under study for 
the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. Analysing Figure 3.1, no ROP funding 
regarding the ERDF scheme is identified for the two Polish regions, while Romania was not yet a member 
of the EU community during the 2000-2006 period. Moreover, the graphs show that Calabria, in Italy, and 
Extremadura, in Spain, received approximately ten times more funding than the rest regions under study. 
Based on the graph, all regions exhibit a regular accumulation of the ERDF payments. As shown in Figure 
3.2, no ROP funding regarding the ERDF scheme is identified for Sud-Est, in Romania, and Essex, in United 
Kingdom. With respect to the rest regions, Calabria, in Italy, and Extremadura, in Spain, along with the two 
Polish regions, receive significant amounts of the ERDF fund. Notably, all regions follow a regular 
distribution of the cumulative payments, except for Calabria, in Italy, which demonstrates an abrupt 
increase of payments’ absorption in 2015. 
 
Figure	 3.1. Accumulation of ROP payments regarding ERDF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
14 
 
 
Figure	 3.2. Accumulation of ROP payments regarding ERDF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the accumulation of the ESF payments to the regions under study for the 
programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. In line with ERDF funds, no ROP funding 
regarding the ERDF scheme is identified for the two Polish regions, as well as Sud-Est, in Romania for the 
programming period 2000-2006 (Figure 3.3). Based on the data, Emilia Romagna, in Italy, receives the 
largest amount of ESF funding among the regions under study, followed by Extremadura, in Spain, and 
Calabria, in Italy. Burgenland, in Austria, Norra Mellansverige, in Sweden, and Essex, in United Kingdom, 
receive much less ESF funding as in the ERDF case. In addition, Calabria, in Italy, exhibits again an abrupt 
increase of payments in 2009. Observing Figure 3.4, only four of the nine regions receive ESF funding in the 
context of ROP. The payments to Italian regions, as well as to Extremadura, in Spain, are considerably more 
than those reported in Burgenland, in Austria are. Again, Calabria, in Italy, exhibits sudden growth of 
payments in 2012.   
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Figure	3.3. Accumulation of ROP payments regarding ESF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own elaboration 
based on EU reports). 
 
Figure	3.4. Accumulation of ROP payments regarding ESF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own elaboration 
based on EU reports). 
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3.2. Regionalized national operational plan payments 
Given that the PERCEIVE project focuses on EU funding allocated to the regions, data about regional 
payments are required for the purpose of this research. However, as it is already seen in subsection 3.1, 
some of the regions under study lack ROP programmes. In these cases, regionalised national operational 
plan (r-NOP) data were used. In fact, the historical r-NOP payments during the two programming periods 
constitute estimations calculated and provided by the European Commission (2018a). Although these funds 
might be partially or totally managed by national authorities and not just by LMAs, these data were used as 
an approximation for a comprehensive analysis of all regions participating in the PERCEIVE project. It 
should be mentioned that for all r-NOP data for the first period, payments begin in 2004 and for specific 
regions finish even seven years after the end of the period, namely in 2013. Regarding the second period, 
payments begin in 2007 and may finish even in 2016. Notably, for some regions the funding is still open 
(please refer to subsection 3.3). 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the accumulation of the national ERDF payments to the regions under 
study for the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. Considering that Romania was 
not yet a member of the EU community during the 2000-2006 period, r-NOP data were used for the Polish 
regions that do not receive ROP funding. As shown in Figure 3.5, the two distributions exhibit the same 
behaviour according to the payment estimations, while Dolnośląskie, in Poland, seems to absorb higher 
amounts of ERDF funding compared to Warmińsko-mazurskie, again in Poland. In Figure 3.6, the 
regionalised estimated cumulative payments for Sud-Est, in Romania, and Essex, in United Kingdom, are 
presented. Although both distributions can be considered as regular, the Romania region seems to receive 
a considerably higher amount of funding compared to the British one. 
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Figure	 3.5. Accumulation of r-NOP payments regarding ERDF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
 
Figure	 3.6. Accumulation of r-NOP payments regarding ERDF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the accumulation of the national ESF payments to the regions under study 
for the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. As for ERDF scheme, given that 
Romania was not yet a member of the EU community during the 2000-2006 period, r-NOP data were used 
only for the Polish regions. Although the two distributions follow again the same regular pattern, 
Dolnośląskie, Poland, seems to receive greater amounts of ESF funding than Warmińsko-mazurskie, Poland 
(Figure 3.7). However, the difference between the funding of the two regions compared to the ERFD funds 
is lower. During the following period, estimates indicate that the Polish regions get the highest ESF financial 
support among the regions without ROP funding, followed by Sud-Est, in Romania (Figure 3.8). On the other 
hand, Norra Mellansverige, in Sweden, and Essex, in United Kingdom, seem to receive rather low amounts 
of regionalised ESF funds. However, all distributions seem to follow a regular pattern. 
 
Figure	 3.7. Accumulation of r-NOP payments regarding ESF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
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Figure	 3.8. Accumulation of r-NOP payments regarding ESF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 
3.3. Regional absorption rates 
To compare the funds’ absorption efficiency of all regions, the annual absorption rates (ARs) were 
investigated. In fact, the annual AR of a region constitutes the ratio of the annual accumulated payments to 
the total commitments allocated to the region for the whole programming period, calculated for each fund 
type separately. In other words, the annual AR provides a normalisation of the cumulative payments, 
offering a comparison of the related efficiency among the regions. To provide a holistic analysis, ARs were 
calculated both for ROP and r-NOP regions under study. For ROP regions, annual ARs were easily computed 
given that annual cumulative payments, as well as total commitments, were provided by the related EU 
reports (please refer to subsection 1). For the rest r-NOP regions, there was an absence of estimations for 
the total commitments for each region. Therefore, the final absorption rates at the closing date of the related 
national funding programmes were utilised (as communicated via e-mail by the EU officers), assuming that 
they remain constant for all regions of each country and equal to the r-NOP absorption rate. Then, the total 
commitments were easily calculated as the ratio of the total estimated payments to the respective final 
rates. As a next step, the annual absorption rates were estimated as the ratio of the annual cumulative 
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payments to the aforementioned total commitments. Unfortunately, for some regions no final absorption 
rates were provided, thus the calculation of the total allocations and the annual absorption rates wasn’t 
feasible. 
            Figures 3.9 and 3.10 depict the distribution of the absorption rates of the national ERDF 
payments to the regions under study for the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. 
As shown in Figure 3.9, all regions apart from Calabria, in Italy, and Essex, in United Kingdom, demonstrate 
a 100% absorption of the ERDF funds during the first period. Specifically, the funding of the British region 
closed with a 99,5% absorption, while notably for the Italian region the funding is still open reaching in 
2014 an absorption of 95%. Comparing the slopes of the distributions, Norra Mellansverige, Sweden, 
exhibits the most efficient absorption of the ERDF funds (based on the real ROP data), while the Polish 
regions the least efficient (based on the estimated r-NOP data). In addition, although Extremadura, Spain, 
starts with a rather quick absorption, after 2006 there is a deceleration of rate. Burgenland, Austria, and 
Essex, United Kingdom, demonstrate a regular absorption, while the two Italian regions exhibit a slightly 
unbalanced rate between 2004 and 2008. In Figure 3.10, only Emilia Romagna, in Italy, Warmińsko-
mazurskie, in Poland, and Norra Mellansverige, in Sweden, exhibit a 100% absorption of the ERDF funds 
during the period 2007-2013. Burgenland, Austria, has a final absorption of 96,5%, while for the rest 
regions the funding is still open. Unfortunately, no data were available for Sud-Est, Romania, and Essex, 
United Kingdom. Concerning the performance of the regions, Burgenland, Austria, and Norra Mellansverige, 
Sweden, demonstrate the best absorption efficiency of ERDF funds, while Calabria, Italy, the worst 
efficiency. In addition, except for Calabria, Italy, that demonstrates an abrupt increase of absorption in 2015, 
the rest regions follow a rather regular sigmoid-shaped absorption pattern. 
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Figure	 3.9. Absorption rates for ERDF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
 
Figure	3.10. Absorption rates for ERDF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
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Figures 3.11 and 3.12 present the distribution of the absorption rates of the national ESF payments to 
the regions under study for the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 respectively. Analysing 
Figure 3.11, all regions except for Burgenland, Austria, and Calabria, Italy, absorb the total amount ESF 
funds committed for the first period. Specifically, the funding of the Austrian region closed with a 99,62% 
absorption, while notably that of the Italian region with a rather low rate of only 72,21%. Comparing the 
slopes of the distributions, Norra Mellansverige, Sweden, exhibits the most efficient absorption of the ESF 
funds, followed by Emilia Romagna, Italy, and Dolnośląskie, Poland. Once again, Calabria, Italy, has the least 
efficient and most irregular absorption rate, as the ESF funds in the latter region are absorbed in three 
phases. In the rest regions, the absorption of the payments seems to follow a rather regular sigmoid-shaped 
pattern. Observing Figure 3.12, only Burgenland, Austria, the two Polish regions and Extremadura, Spain, 
demonstrate an absorption of 100% regarding the ESF payments during the period 2007-2013. Sud-Est, 
Romania, and Norra Mellansverige, Sweden, have a final absorption rate of 95% and 99% respectively, 
while notably for the two Italian regions the program is still open. Unfortunately, no data were available for 
Essex, United Kingdom. Regarding the efficiency of the regions, Burgenland, Austria, is the most efficient in 
terms of ESF funds’ absorption, while Calabria, Italy, and Sud-Est, Romania, the least efficient. In addition, 
Calabria, Italy, Sud-Est, Romania, and Norra Mellansverige, Sweden, exhibit rather uneven absorption rates, 
in contrast to the rest regions that follow a more balanced and regular pattern. 
 
Figure	 3.11. Absorption rates for ESF fund during 2000-2006 period (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
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Figure	 3.12. Absorption rates for ESF fund during 2007-2013 period (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
3.4. Programming period comparisons 
In addition to comparing the absorption rates among the regions for each fund and period, it may be 
also interesting to investigate and compare the absorption for each region and fund between the two 
programming periods. This analysis can provide meaningful insights about the impact of the first period’s 
absorption on that of the second period, as well as about the differences in the absorption behaviour 
between the two periods. In this subsection, an analysis for the Italian regions is provided, while all relevant 
graphs for the rest regions are presented in the Appendix A. 
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 depict the ERDF absorption rate for Calabria, Italy, and Emilia Romagna, Italy, 
respectively along the two programming periods. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 illustrate the ESF absorption rate 
for Calabria, Italy, and Emilia Romagna, Italy, respectively. It is notable in all graphs that in Calabria, Italy, 
for some years there is almost no absorption (those years almost coincide in both programs and policy 
cycles approximately between 2009 and 2013) and then there is an abrupt growth of the absorption. 
Oppositely in Emilia Romagna, Italy, absorption rates are very regular and almost always reach 100% 
(except for the ESF scheme during the 2007-2013 period), in contrast to Calabria, Italy, that never reach 
100%. However, here it is visible that when the new policy cycle begins, in 2007, the absorption in the 
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previous one stops for a couple of years and then it starts over and reaches the complete absorption or in 
any case higher values. 
 
Figure	3.13. Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Calabria, Italy (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
 
Figure	3.14. Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Emilia Romagna, Italy (Own elaboration 
based on EU reports). 
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Figure	3.15. Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Calabria, Italy (Own elaboration based on EU 
reports). 
 
Figure	3.16. Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Emilia Romagna, Italy (Own elaboration based 
on EU reports). 
To provide a more comprehensive analysis, Figures 3.17 and 3.18 present the ERDF absorption rate 
for Calabria, Italy, and Emilia Romagna, Italy, respectively from a period overlap perspective. Comparing 
the absorption between the two periods, in Calabria, Italy, the ERDF rate is smoother in the first period than 
the second one thus the two slopes do not seem to match, while in Emilia Romagna, Italy, the slopes of the 
rates almost overlap perfectly indicating a regular and constant performance over the periods. In the same 
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vein, Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show the ESF absorption rate for Calabria, Italy, and Emilia Romagna, Italy, 
respectively from a period overlap perspective. Once again, while in Calabria, Italy, the absorption lines 
seem to oppose each other, in Emilia Romagna, Italy, the two distributions exhibit the same regular 
behaviour showing an almost perfect match. Notably, in Calabria, Italy, there is a more balanced absorption 
in the first period of the ERDF funding, while in the ESF funding this behaviour is observed (yet slightly) in 
the second period. 
 
Figure	3.17. Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Calabria, Italy, with programming period 
overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports). 
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Figure	3.18. Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Emilia Romagna, Italy, with programming 
period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports). 
 
Figure	 3.19. Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Calabria, Italy, with programming period 
overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports). 
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Figure	3.20. Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Emilia Romagna, Italy, with programming 
period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports). 
3.5. National awareness 
Apart from the analysis of the absorption of the regional EU funds, the aim of the PERCEIVE project is 
to investigate the awareness of European citizens about the EU funded projects on their regions. To this 
end, data were retrieved from the available EU Eurobarometer reports (European Commission, 1995; 2008; 
2010; 2013; 2015; 2017). The reports are not annual, thus the data collected are scattered along the time. 
The first report is identified in 1992 and the last one in 2017. It should be mentioned that some regions 
were not member of the EU since 1992, thus the relevant data are not available. Figure 3.21 illustrates the 
citizens’ awareness (at a national level) about regional EU funded projects according to the 
Eurobarometers. The graph depicts the citizens’ positive response to a general question, such as: “Have you 
heard about any EU co-financed project that improves the region you live in?”, for all nations with regions 
under study in the context of the PERCEIVE project. It should be mentioned that this question changes 
slightly during the years (Appendix A, Table A5). Each point in the graph constitutes the percentage of 
aware citizens as provided by the EU, while all values of the awareness between the documented ones are 
assumed to follow a linear trend.  
Notably, the awareness data among the countries do not seem to follow the same unique pattern. More 
specifically, although in Austria, Italy, Spain, the awareness is increasing up to 2008, following the average 
EU trend, in the United Kingdom and Sweden, a decreasing or constant trend is identified. After 2008, only 
in Poland, citizens’ awareness increases, reaching the highest percentage among all regions in 2017 
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(approximately 80%). Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom exhibit a considerably decreasing trend, while 
Romania and Sweden demonstrate a slightly increasing up to 2010 but then a decreasing one. In Italy, 
awareness seems to fluctuate after 2008, showing a decrease up to 2010, an abrupt increase up to 2013 and 
then a decrease again. All awareness data are presented analytically in tables in the Appendix A. 
Interestingly, although the funding absorption follows an increasing behaviour because projects completed 
and refunded are accumulating, the citizens’ awareness does not seem to follow the same pattern. In other 
words, although more regional EU funded projects are performed through the years, it seems that there is 
a missing communication link that leads to the insufficient citizens’ awareness about European Cohesion 
Policy.  
 
Figure	 3.21. Citizens’ awareness on regional EU funded projects (Own elaboration based on EU 
Eurobarometers). 
Except for the Eurobarometers, an empirical research regarding the awareness of citizens about 
regional EU projects was carried out by the PERCEIVE researchers in 2017, as presented in the Deliverable 
1.2 (Charron and Baur, 2017). People were asked to reply to the following question: “Have you ever heard 
about any EU-funded project in your region-area?”. The results of the study are presented in on Table 3.1. 
More specifically, the higher national awareness is documented in Poland (78%) and Spain (61%) and the 
lowest one in Austria (31%) and the United Kingdom (25%). As regards the regional awareness, the highest 
one is depicted in the Polish regions (more than 80%) and the lowest one in Norra Mellansverige (39%), 
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Sweden, and Essex (18%), United Kingdom. In addition, the major percentage differences between national 
and regional awareness, using the national awareness as a base, is highlighted in Austria (+65%), United 
Kingdom (-28%), Romania (-36%) and Spain (+20%).  
Figure 3.22 provides a comparison of the citizens’ awareness data between the Eurobarometer and the 
PERCEIVE deliverable in 2017. In fact, the graph maps significant differences between the two sources of 
data, highlighting even PERCEIVE values approximately twice the values of the Eurobarometer in Austria, 
Spain and Sweden. On the contrary, the lowest differences are documented in Poland and Romania. These 
considerable differences are detected probably due the different nature of the questions asked to the 
citizens. In fact, the EU question seems to be more specific asking about the awareness on EU co-financed 
projects that improve the regions in contrast to the more general PERCEIVE question. This fact may explain 
the lower percentages of the Eurobarometer study in most of the regions compared to PERCEIVE research, 
as people are sensitive to the way a question is asked and thus a more detailed question may lead to 
limitation in the responses.  
Table	3.1. Citizens’ awareness on regional EU funded projects in 2017 (Source: PERCEIVE Deliverable 1.2). 
Country	
National	
positive	
response	
Region	
Regional	
positive	
response	
%	Difference	
(National	
responses	as	a	
base)	
Austria 31% Burgenland 51% 64.52% 
Italy 62% Calabria 65% 4.84% 
  Emilia Romagna 68% 9.68% 
Poland 78% Dolnośląskie 81% 3.85% 
  Warmińsko-
mazurskie 
84% 7.69% 
Romania 39% Sud-Est 25% -35.90% 
Spain 61% Extremadura 73% 19.67% 
Sweden 42% Norra 
Mellansverige 
39% -7.14% 
United Kingdom 25% Essex 18% -28.00% 
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Figure	3.22. Comparison of citizens’ awareness on regional EU funded projects on 2017 (Own elaboration 
based on EU reports and PERCEIVE Deliverable 1.2). 
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4. Qualitative analysis of the system: Causal loop diagrams 
Due to the size and complexity of the system under study, we divided our analysis into two subsystems, 
namely: (i) the fund absorption system, and (ii) the general public awareness system. The fund 
absorption system focuses on the expenditure of EU structural funds in a LMA context, while the general 
public awareness system concentrates on the number of people aware of the EU role in the Cohesion policy 
still within the LMA region. Notably, the two systems are tightly interrelated given that the outputs of the 
one are inputs to the other and vice versa. As above mentioned, a LMA perspective is adopted as level of 
analysis. This choice has been taken in order to be in line with the PERCEIVE general approach. Therefore, 
only the aspects directly affecting (or affected) by the LMA performance, actions, scope and objectives are 
taken into consideration and described in detail. EU and nation-state actions are clearly important for LMA 
activities; however, they have been considered as external inputs to the system. Below, the qualitative 
representations of the two systems are going to be presented and explained.  
4.1. Funds absorption system 
In the following subsections, an elaborate analysis of the funds absorption system is provided. The 
system is divided into several smaller parts for facilitating the description.  
4.1.1. Funds absorption overview 
The system under study reflects the main flow of European Cohesion Policy funds from the EU to the 
regions, including all parameters and factors that affect this procedure. Notably, the analysis is multi-level, 
including three key players: the EU, the regions and the final beneficiaries. In fact, the causal loop diagram 
illustrates how the initial EU funding is distributed dynamically, beginning from the allocation of the funds 
to the regions up until the final refund of the beneficiaries for the projects accepted. Four major feedback 
loops exist in the system, namely: the “local managing authority learning” loop (in green), the “potential 
applications” loop (in purple), the “word of mouth” loop (in brown) and the “strategies to increase 
absorption rate” loop (in orange), all of which affecting (and get affected by) the main funding flow. Notably, 
some of the loops are intertwined, further highlighting the complexity of the system.  
To develop the causal loop diagram, three types of sources were utilized: (i) EU literature, (ii) scientific 
literature and (iii) interviews with experts on the field. EU literature was used to build accurately the main 
flow of European Cohesion Policy funding. Given the rather qualitative nature of the rest variables within 
the system, scientific literature was utilised to the best possible extent to support the explanation of the 
connections among the variables. In case of an absence of related literature, empirical evidence was used to 
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
33 
 
validate the reliability of the relationships. In fact, PERCEIVE researchers performed interviews with 
experts in the area of EU funding to find any missing factors or links in the loops. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
causal loop diagram of the system. The different parts of the diagram are explained in detail in the following 
subsections. In addition, all connections among the variables, together with the elaborate list of sources 
used, are presented in Appendix B.  
	
Figure	4.1. Funds absorption system: causal loop diagram. 	
4.1.2. Pipeline and resource stocks 
The European Cohesion Policy funding scheme can be represented through a pipeline of stocks and 
rates, which is depicted in Figure 4.2. All resource stocks, reflecting the accumulation of funds, calls and 
projects in the system, are indicated, as already mentioned in section 2, with rectangles, while valves are 
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indicated with rates. At the start, after all necessary procedures to allocate funds are carried out (time to 
allocate funds at EU level), the “EU funds” flow in a stock of “Total funds available”, which in turn can be 
reduced when EU pays its commitments (“payments to beneficiaries” valve is opened). “Total funds 
available” stock directly affects LMA’s “EU funds allocation” rate, which determines the amount of “Region 
calls for EU funds”, after some time needed to prepare the call (“time to prepare call”). In fact, the more funds 
are allocated regionally, the more calls are prepared by the regions. Then, potential beneficiaries can apply 
to these calls. This happens in the system through the “application rate” mechanism: depending on the 
number of calls, potential beneficiaries make application, which accumulate into the stock of “Projects 
submitted”. It is important to note that this process is not instantaneous, but it takes time to prepare and 
submit a project proposal (“submission time”). After that, these submitted applications are evaluated 
(“evaluation rate”) based on an “evaluation time”, and all of those projects passing the evaluation accumulate 
into the stock of “Projects accepted”. Later, after a delay, these projects gets signed (“contracting time”) and 
therefore “contracting rate” moves the projects approved to the state of “Signed and approved projects”. 
Subsequently, after the bureaucratic requirements are performed (“bureaucratic requirements time”), the 
projects in this stock are put in place for a while (“utilization and realization time”). This is represented by 
the “utilization and realization rate” that brings completed projects in the stock of “Projects completed under 
control”. Here, they are assessed for a period of time (“monitoring time”) and those that pass the monitoring 
phase move through the “monitoring rate” to the state of “Projects awaiting to be refunded”. After 
technicalities are solved and processed (“time to get refunded”), beneficiaries finally get refunded 
(“refunding rate”) and all these projects accumulate in a stock named “Refunded and completed projects”. 
Two issues need to be mentioned: first, the “refunding rate”, at the end of the pipeline, determines directly 
the initial “payments to beneficiaries”; second, along the whole pipeline, each rate is influenced by the related 
time for the process. It is important to remember that always the higher is the time, the lower the rate is. 
	
Figure	4.2. Funds absorption system: main pipeline. 	
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4.1.3. Time to allocate funds at EU level 
Figure 4.3 presents more in detail the factors affecting “time to allocate funds at EU level”. This time is 
comprised of two different components: “ROP approval time” and “ROP development time” (ROP stands for 
Regional Operational Programme). In fact, EU does not proceed to make the funding available to the LMA if 
the ROP hasn’t been approved and, obviously, the ROP can’t be approved if it hasn’t been developed yet. The 
higher the two times are, the higher the “time to allocate funds at EU level” is (George, 2008; Milio, 2007) 
and this might result in delayed start of the LMA calls’ writing phase. More specifically, the “ROP 
development time” is further influenced by the “date of EU policy cycle regulation approval” and the “national-
EU partnership agreement delay” (George, 2008; Milio, 2007). In fact, when there is a delay in the date that 
the EU approves the related framework regulation or a delay between EU and the nation that receives the 
funding in signing the partnership agreement, the LMA can’t proceed to develop its ROP. 
	
Figure	4.3.	Funds absorption system: funds allocation at EU level.	
4.1.4. Local managing authority learning loop 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the local managing authority learning loop. Actually, this is not a sole loop but it 
is a structure of five different loops, given that local management authority’s administrative capacity affects 
most of the delays involved in the EU funding process. More specifically, an accumulation of successful 
“Refunded and completed projects” generates an enhancement in experience and ability in the organization 
and managing of the funds (“local managing authority skills learning”). This leads to an increase in the “staff 
capacity” (Berică, 2010; Hapenciuc et al., 2013; Jaliu and Rǎdulescu, 2012; Lucian, 2014; Sumpíková et al., 
2004; Tatar, 2010), which is further influenced by changes in “staff number” and “equipment availability”. A 
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raise in “staff capacity” fosters the “local managing authority administrative capacity” (Berică, 2010; 
Hapenciuc et al., 2013; Jaliu and Rǎdulescu, 2012; Lucian, 2014; Sumpíková et al., 2004; Tatar, 2010), 
together with “institution quality”, understood as quality of governance (Charron et al., 2015), and “regional 
political suitability”. This latter is a qualitative broad concept comprising many other concepts such as the 
regional organization, structure and size suitability to manage EU funds (Milio, 2007), the degree of regional 
autonomy in administering structural funds (George, 2008; Smętkowski et al., 2018; Tatar, 2010; Kyriacou 
and Roca-Sagalés, 2012), the number of departments involved in the process and the degree of cooperation 
among them (Milio, 2007; George, 2008; Lucian, 2014) and the overall political stability, continuity and 
correspondence with EU ideals. “Regional political suitability” also affects “ROP quality”, that is, the adequacy 
of ROP to be easily implementable, to respond exactly to local beneficiaries needs and to be flexible enough 
to adapt to context variations. In turn, ROP directly influences “call quality and support”. Getting back to the 
administrative capacity, an increase in its value reduces the time needed to process calls, applications and, 
in general, processes within the EU funding system (i.e. “submission time”, “evaluation time”, “contracting 
time” and “monitoring time”), given the increasing efficiency of the local managing authority. A decrease of 
each different time increases the related rates, making the flow through the pipeline quicker and therefore 
leading to more efficient processes. Similarly, in the broader loop, a reduction in the “time to prepare call” 
increases the “EU funds allocation” rate, which in turn increases the “Region calls for EU funds” stock. Then, 
an increase in this stock further increases the “application rate” (the more the calls are, the more project 
applications are submitted). The same positive effect is transmitted to the “Refunded and completed 
projects” stock. Finally, an increase in the aforementioned stock raises the knowledge of the local managing 
authorities and hence the “local managing authority skills learning” (Hapenciuc et al., 2013; Jaliu and 
Rǎdulescu, 2012; Lucian, 2014). Given that the loop has begun with an increase in the “local managing 
authority skills learning” and closed with an increase in the same variable, this loop can be considered as a 
reinforcing, or positive, loop. The other four loops follow exactly the same behavior.   
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Figure	4.4. Funds absorption system: local managing authorities learning loop. 
4.1.5. Project applications loop 
Figure 4.5 presents the potential project applications loop. Before getting into the loop, it’s important 
to note that the number of “total potential beneficiaries” consists of the sum of the “public potential 
beneficiaries”, “interinstitutional coordinated potential beneficiaries”, “private potential beneficiaries” and the 
“public-private potential beneficiaries”. In fact, these are the groups that, once added, make up the broader 
pool of beneficiaries who can apply for funds. Therefore, an increase of each component increases the total 
sum (George, 2008; Squinzi, 2013; Jaliu and Rǎdulescu, 2012). From this initial number representing the 
total potential in the region subjects who could make an application for a call, the system operates a series 
of ‘cuts’, which give a final number of potential beneficiaries that actually apply. We can imagine this as a 
sort of stream and every step we lose a portion of the total potential beneficiaries because they do not pass 
the cut. Getting back to the structure, a growth in the “total potential beneficiaries” causes an augmentation 
in the “total potential projects applications per call of interested beneficiaries” (T1) (Zaman and Cristea, 
2011). This latter not only depends on the total number of potential beneficiaries but also on the “probability 
a beneficiary is interested in the call”, which in turn depends on “local stakeholders umbrella organizations 
contribution” and on the “call quality and support”. As for “local stakeholders umbrella organizations 
contribution” , different stakeholders such as industrial, commercial, public organization can be involved in 
the call development to make the call more suitable for local needs and therefore more desirable in the eyes 
of potential beneficiaries. As for  “call quality and support” , if a call is written in an easily accessible format 
and takes into account the possible necessities of potential beneficiaries and high quality support is offered 
during the application procedure, the probability a beneficiary is interested raises.  If an increase in T1 
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occurs, the “total potential project applications per call of interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding 
opportunity” (T2) grows too (Barbiero et al., 2017). As the name suggests, this variable takes into account 
not only the beneficiaries finding the call interesting but also the fact that they need to be informed about 
its existence in order to apply (T2 is regulated also by “probability of knowledge of EU funding opportunities”, 
this variable will be discussed in detail next paragraph). A change in T2, in turn, positively affects the “total 
potential project applications per call of interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding opportunities who 
find convenient to apply” (T3) (Barbiero et al., 2017). This latter is also negatively influenced by any increase 
in the “cost of making an application for EU funds” that the beneficiaries should pay (Tatar, 2010), this latter 
being, obviously a discouraging factor. Then, an increase in T3 raises the “total potential project applications 
per call of interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding opportunities who find convenient to apply and 
who are able to co-finance” (T4), which is reduced by an increase “project co-finance percentage” asked to 
the beneficiaries (Berică, 2010; George, 2008; Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė, 2013; Zaman and Cristea, 2011; 
Sumpíková et al., 2004; Tatar, 2010). Here, the skimming of the initial potential number continues: for 
applying for EU fund in the last instance, beneficiaries needs also ‘to satisfy’ the criteria of being able to co-
finance the project. Finally, an increase in T4 further increases the “total potential project applications per 
call of interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding opportunities who find convenient to apply, who are 
able to co-finance and who are not discouraged by delays in refunding” (T5) (Berică, 2010; George, 2008; 
Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė, 2013; Zaman and Cristea, 2011; Sumpíková et al., 2004; Tatar, 2010). This latter 
quantity is reduced by an increase in the “time to be refunded” regarding the beneficiaries’ projects (Jaliu 
and Rǎdulescu, 2012). This mechanism acts as last funnel to the total potential beneficiaries’ stream (the 
more beneficiaries have to wait after a project is completed to be refunded the more they perceive the 
investment as risky and therefore they are discouraged to apply), and the corresponding structure will be 
explained in detail in paragraph 4.1.7. After all the described cuts, and following the loop’s logic, an increase 
in T5, which reflects the final amount of the total potential applications that are going to be submitted, 
fosters the “applications rate”. Hereafter, the positive relationships (i.e. increasing effects) continue, as 
indicated before in paragraph 4.1.4 for the local managing authority learning loop, up to the “local managing 
authority administrative capacity” that also has a positive effect on the “call quality and support” (Barbiero 
et al., 2017). An increase in the “call quality and support” towards the potential beneficiaries that aim to 
submit an application leads to an increase in the “probability a beneficiary is interested in the call” (Barbiero 
et al., 2017; Milio, 2007; Tatar, 2010), as previously explained. At the end of the loop, an increase in the 
aforementioned probability further raises T1, “total potential projects applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries”. Given that the loop has begun with an increase in the T1 and closed also with an increase in 
the same variable, this loop can be considered as a reinforcing, or else positive, loop. 
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Figure	4.5. Funds absorption system: project applications loop.	
4.1.6. Word of mouth loop 
Figure 4.6 depicts the word of mouth loop. The logic underlying this structure is that the more EU 
funded projects are successfully completed the more beneficiaries will positively talk about EU funding and 
consequently inform other potential beneficiaries about this opportunity. Such mechanism translates in the 
structure in the following way: a raise in the “Refunded and completed projects” stock pushes the 
“beneficiaries word of mouth”, which in turn fosters the “probability of knowledge of EU funding 
opportunities”. This probability can be also increased by increments in the “region communication mix of EU 
funds”, “media coverage of EU funding opportunities”, “local stakeholders umbrella organizations 
contribution” and “intermediary consultancy companies” that can improve the communication of the funding 
Total
funds
available
LMA calls
for EU
fund
Projects
submitted
Projects
accepted
Signed and
approved
projects
Refunded and
completed
projects
applications
rate
evaluation rate contracting rate
Projects
awaiting to
be refunded refunding rateutilization andrealization rate
time to allocate
funds at EU level
time to prepare
call submission time
-
evaluation time
contracting time
utilization and
realization time
time to get
refunded
-
-
-
-
project co-finance
percentage
-
LMA administrative
capacity
LMA skills
learning
+
+
-
-
-
institutions
quality
regional political
suitability
+
+ROP quality
call quality and
support
+
+
private potential
beneficiaries
public potential
beneficiaries
public-private
potential partnerships
interinstitutional
coordinated potential
beneficiaries
total potential
beneficiaries
+
+
+
+
+ +
+
total potential projects
applications per call of
interested beneficiaries
+
probability a
beneficiary is interested
in the calll
+
+
+
total potential project applications
per call of interested beneficiaries
aware of the EU funding
opportunity
total potential project applications per
call of interested beneficiaries aware of
the EU funding opportunities who find
convenient to apply
total potential project applications per call of
interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding
opportunities who find convenient to apply, who
are able to co-finance and who are not discouraged
by delays in refunding
+
+
+
+
probability of knowledge
of EU funding
opportunities+
cost of making an
application for EU
funds
-
EU funds
+
LMA staff
capacity+
total potential project applications per call of
interested beneficiaries aware of the EU
funding opportunities who find convenient to
apply and who are able to co-finance
+
funds allocation at
LMA level
payments to
beneficiaries
+
bureaucratic
requirements time
-
beneficiary staff
capacity
call bureaucracy
involved
-
+
-
-
ROP
delelopment time
+
ROP approval
time
+
date of EU policy
cycle regulation
approval
national-EU
partnership agreement
delay
+
+
LMA
equipment
LMA staff
number+
+
local stakeholders
umbrella organizations
contribution
+
<refunding
rate>
+
Projects
completed
under
control monitoring rate
monitoring time
+
+
<aborsption rate
gap>
'side projects'
rate
+
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
40 
 
programmes to potential beneficiaries and inform them about both the existence of EU financing support 
calls and the feasibility of accessing to this funds (Barbiero et al., 2017; Borz et al., 2018; Capello and 
Perucca, 2017; Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė, 2013). Continuing within the loop, a change in the “probability of 
knowledge of EU funding opportunities” affects the number of “total potential project applications per call of 
interested beneficiaries aware of the EU funding opportunity” (Barbiero et al., 2017) and, following the chain 
of variables, this translates in an increase of applications and such positive effect continues up until the 
“Refunded and completed projects” stock (as showed in paragraph 4.1.4). Given that the loop has begun with 
an increase in the aforementioned stock and closed with an increase in the same variable, this loop can be 
considered as a reinforcing, or positive, loop. 
	
Figure	4.6. Funds absorption system: word of mouth loop.	
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4.1.7. Shortcut strategies to increase absorption loop 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the shortcut strategies that a local managing authority can adopt with the 
purpose of increasing absorption rate if necessary. In fact, the absorption can be increased either by 
decreasing the standards of the projects’ quality (the authority decreases its standards in order to accept 
more projects2) or by extending funding for existing projects (‘side projects’). Thus, this is represented by 
not a sole loop but two different loops, as it is going to be described below. Beginning from the “Refunded 
and completed projects”, an increase in this stock increases the “absorption rate” of the EU funds (which 
clearly depends on the value of “Total available funds” stock) (Tatar, 2010; Zaman and Cristea, 2011). 
Consequently, an increasing “absorption rate” decreases the “absorption rate gap” (which is expressed as a 
comparison to an “ideal absorption rate”). Here, the two different loops separate. In the first loop, a 
reduction in the “absorption rate gap” allows the local managing authority to increase its “standards for 
project quality” to optimize the number of the projects that are going to be accepted. Thus, an increase in 
the “standards for project quality” reduces the “acceptance rate” which in turn decreases the “evaluation 
rate” (Burja and Jeler, 2018; Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė, 2013; Zaman and Cristea, 2011). As a result, as 
shown in paragraph 4.1.4, a reduction of the aforementioned rate will finally lead to a decrease of the 
“Refunded and completed projects” stock. At the same time, a reduction in the “absorption rate gap” 
decreases the “‘side projects’ rate”, which refers to the further financing of projects already implemented in 
order to boost the absorption of the EU funding (Corte dei Conti, 2017). Then, a reduction of the “‘side 
projects’ rate” reduces the “Projects accepted” stock value. Following again the same positive effect 
described in in paragraph 4.1.4, a reduction of the latter stock will decrease the “Refunded and completed 
projects” stock. In both cases, given that the loops have begun with an increase in the aforementioned stock 
and closed with a reduction in the same variable, these loops can be considered as balancing, or else 
negative, loops. In this case, it is important to note that this loop tends to work the other way around. If the 
“absorption rate” is not high enough, and inevitably the “absorption gap” is too large, as said, local authorities 
may tend to decreases their standards in order to augment the number of projects that get accepted and 
ultimately to increase the absorption. Similarly, for “side projects rate”, when the absorption gap is large, 
the managing authority might decide to compensate with an increase in the side project flow, which quickly 
                                                           
2 The idea that qualitative standards can be lowered to increase absorption rate the controversial. The workshops, 
focus groups and interviews that we conducted with stakeholders and policy-makers reached different conclusions in 
this issue. A different perspective to address the issue is one that points at the possibility to increase the potential 
number of beneficiaries by broadening the content of the calls. It is, however, argued that by facilitating the access of 
potential beneficiaries to the call, less motivated beneficiaries are reached thereby decreasing the average level of 
proposal. We reached the conclusion that this mechanism need to be further investigated.   
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increases the number of project funded and therefore the absorption. Obviously, the decreasing of projects 
accepted standards produces the effect of decreasing the quality of the average EU funded project under 
that policy scheme.  
	
Figure	4.7. Funds absorption system: shortcut strategies to increase absorption loop. 
4.1.8. Time to get refunded as a possible discouraging factor 
The last mechanism represented in the funds absorption causal loop diagram is portrayed with a blue 
line and it is visible in Figure 4.8 below. Once the monitoring authority has checked a project, it has to wait 
a certain amount of time to be refunded (“time to get refunded”). That amount of time seems to be a relevant 
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factor in the potential beneficiaries’ considerations: if this time increase too much (or appear to be 
unreliable) it can discourage potential beneficiaries from applying because they do not feel they can rely on 
the regularity of payments.  
 	
Figure	4.8. Funds absorption system: time to be refunded as a possible discouraging factor. 
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4.2. General public awareness system 
In the following subsections, an elaborate analysis of the general public awareness system is provided. 
The system is divided into several smaller parts for providing a more efficient description.  
 
4.2.1. General public awareness overview 
The system under study reflects the main streams of information that affect the European citizens’ 
awareness about EU Structural Funds, namely the ERDF and ESF schemes. In the context of the PERCEIVE 
project, a person is considered as aware if they have heard about any EU co-financed project that improves the 
area where they live. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first research effort for mapping all major factors 
that potentially influence these streams of information. In fact, there are four main streams as presented in 
Figure 1, namely: (i) the “EU direct” stream (highlighted in blue), (ii) the “local managing authority” stream 
(highlighted in orange), (iii) the “media” stream (highlighted in red), and (iv) the “funded projects 
implemented stream” (highlighted in green).  The system further includes a “closed pipeline” mechanism 
that balances the trade-off between citizens’ awareness and forgetfulness about EU funded projects on their 
region. In contrast to the funds absorption part, which was based on both EU/scientific literature and 
interviews with experts, the development of the general public absorption part is mainly based on empirical 
research, including observation of the real world, communication with general public and of course 
interviews with experts on the field, all performed by PERCEIVE researchers. Figure 4.9 illustrates the 
causal loop diagram of the system. The different parts of the diagram are explained in detail in the following 
subsections. 
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Figure	4.9. General public awareness system: causal loop diagram. 
4.2.2. System main “closed pipeline” 
Figure 4.10 depicts the main flow of citizens that get either aware or forgetful about the European 
Cohesion Policy. More specifically, a growth in the rate of actual “births” in a region increases the total 
number of “citizens unaware of EU role in cohesion policy” (system state), as new-borns are obviously not 
aware of the existence of cohesion policy.  Through the years, citizens might get aware and they move 
through the “total citizens getting aware of EU role in cohesion policy” rate from being aware to the stock of 
citizens aware (“citizens aware of EU role in cohesion policy”). The total number of aware citizens can be 
decreased due a rise of two different rates: either (i) the rate of actual “deaths” in the regions or (ii) the 
“citizens ‘forgetting’ of EU role in cohesion policy” rate. In fact, the rate of forgetfulness can be augmented 
when the “citizens average forgetting time of EU role in cohesion policy” is reduced, as the lower this time is 
the quicker the citizens forget about European Cohesion Policy. The aforementioned rate further fosters the 
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total number of unaware citizens, closing the circular flow that represents the trade-off between citizens’ 
awareness and forgetfulness. 
In addition, an increase in the “citizens aware of EU role in cohesion policy” state causes the growth of 
the “EU acceptance”, which in turn raises the “general citizens interest on the EU matter”. In fact, as the 
awareness grows, citizens seem to accept more the concept of EU, thus, they get more concerned about EU 
issues. The citizens’ interest can be further boosted when “average citizens’ education” or “salience of EU in 
public debate” is augmented. In general, as resulting from our PERCEIVE survey, people that are more 
educated are potentially keener on political issues, including EU topic, while the prominence of EU publicly 
can further foster citizens’ interest. Notably, the “salience of EU in public debate” might increase when the 
“degree of Eurosceptic parties” is increased, as Euroscepticism usually constitutes a focal topic on public 
political discussion. Furthermore, a growth in the “general citizens interest on the EU matter” can 
consequently lead to a rise of the “interest on EU role in cohesion policy”. At the same time, an interest on 
European Cohesion Policy can be further increased when the “effect of EU funded projects on perceived local 
needs on cohesion policy visibility” grows, as obviously the visibility of the EU projects’ results and effects 
can enhance citizens’ interest. 
Finally, an increase in the interest on European Cohesion Policy can further boost the rise of the “total 
citizens getting aware of EU role in cohesion policy” rate. This rate, which constitutes one of the key variables 
of the system under study, can be positively affected by the variables that express each one of the 
information streams. Namely: (i) “total number of people directly informed by EU per year” (EU direct 
stream), (ii) “total number of people informed by LMA communication mix per year” (local managing 
authority stream), (iii) “total number of people informed by media per year” (media stream), and (iv) “total 
number of people informed about EU role in cohesion policy by projects implemented per year” (funded 
projects implemented stream). 
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Figure	4.10. General public awareness system: main “closed pipeline”. 
4.2.3. EU direct stream of information 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the EU direct stream of information that supports citizens’ awareness about 
European Cohesion Policy. This stream is composed of two sources: one is the Europe Direct agencies work 
with locals (a network of information centres, documentation centres and speakers in every EU region) and 
the other is the communication directly put in place by European institutions through media campaigns.  
With respect to the first sub stream, the total budget that EU provides for informing people about its 
goals and actions through the Europe Direct agency (“Europe Direct budget”) can have a positive influence 
on: (i) the budget of the information campaigns (“Europe Direct average campaign budget”), (ii) the number 
of the related campaigns (“Europe Direct number of campaigns”), as well as (iii) the number of personnel 
that is engaged with such campaigns (“Europe Direct staff”). An increase of the quantity of all three factors 
can lead to a rise of the “total number of people informed by Europe Direct communication activities”, as 
obviously the more and the better the campaigns are the more citizens will get aware about the cohesion 
policy. 
At the same time, both the “EU communication quantity” and the “EU communication quality” in 
general may positively influence the “total number of people informed by EU communication mix per year”, 
excluding the specific campaigns organised. The total number of citizens informed by both the Europe 
Direct agency and the EU in general equals to the “total number of people directly informed by EU per year” 
that in turn may also impact positively the “total citizens getting aware of EU role in cohesion policy” rate. 
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Figure	4.11. General public awareness system: EU direct stream of information. 
4.2.4. Local managing authority stream of information 
Figure 4.12 presents the local managing authority stream of information that enhances citizens’ 
awareness about European Cohesion Policy. More specifically, a part of the EU’s “Total funds available”, 
which is expressed through the “percentage of LMA's EU funds allocated to communication”, covers the “total 
LMA budget available for communication” about the European Cohesion Policy. Then, part of the 
communication budget (expressed through the “percentage of LMA budget assigned to general public 
awareness campaigns”) is especially allocated to the local managing authorities for launching campaigns to 
raise the general public’s awareness (“LMA budget assigned to general public awareness campaigns”). An 
increased budget for campaigns and a high number of local managing authorities’ personnel engaged in 
communication activities (“LMA communication staff”), as well as a potentially high “national contribution 
for specific media campaign”, could foster the number of campaigns the LMA does (“LMA specific media 
communication quantity”). In fact, the more the communication budget is, the more media sessions for 
raising awareness the local managing authorities could cover. Then, increased quantity of media 
communication increases the related rate (“LMA media campaigns starting rate”). However, this rate 
obviously decreases if the “time to approve LMA communication strategy” or the “time to develop and 
implement a LMA media campaign” are high. The media campaigns rate accumulates into a stock of “Active 
LMA media campaigns” that is depleted by the relevant “LMA media campaigns concluded rate”. Finally, an 
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increased total number of “Active LMA media campaigns” can potentially raise the “total specific media 
session with a LMA media campaign”, taking into consideration the “probability of a media session hosting a 
LMA media campaign”. 
In addition, growing citizens’ “EU acceptance” can obviously decrease the “degree of Eurosceptic local 
parties”, which in turn lessens the phenomenon of the so-called “political opportunism” that is the focal goal 
of the Eurosceptic parties. A low “political opportunism” can hopefully lead to an increased “recognizability 
of the EU in the LMA media message” by the citizens, which in turn boosts the likelihood of a positive effect 
of the local managing authorities’ media campaigns on the citizens (“probability LMA media message has an 
impact on citizens”). Such an increased probability, along with a large number of “total specific media session 
with a LMA media campaign”, can raise the “total number of people informed by LMA communication mix per 
year”, as the more the effective local managing authorities’ campaigns exist the more people get informed. 
Finally, the total number of people informed by the local managing authorities further sums to the “total 
citizens getting aware of EU role in cohesion policy” rate. 
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Figure	4.12. General public awareness system: local managing authority stream of information. 
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4.2.5. Media stream of information 
Figure 4.13 depicts the media stream of information that boosts citizens’ awareness about European 
Cohesion Policy. The media affect the awareness through two different streams, namely: (i) the positive 
news stream, and (ii) the negative news stream. Although the two streams cause contradictory types of 
awareness, this part of the model focuses only on the fact that citizens get informed about cohesion policy 
and structural funds, no matter the nature of the news. 
More specifically, the “positive media coverage on cohesion policy” is influenced by the number of 
“Refunded and completed projects”, the “actual average project quality” and the “media attention to cohesion 
policy”. In fact, the more the projects completed are and the better quality they have, the more positive the 
media coverage is. At the same time, when there is a high media attention to related issues (which gets 
fostered by the increased “journalist EU alphabetization”), the positive coverage is further increased. 
Obviously, the “positive media coverage on cohesion policy” has a positive effect on the “positive media 
coverage of the EU on cohesion policy per year”, which is, however, negatively affected by the “political 
opportunism”. In fact, the existence of increased “political opportunism”, which constitutes the consequence 
of low journalists’ political education (“journalist EU alphabetization”) and aims at raising political influence 
by disregarding ethical principles, could decrease the level of positive news on cohesion policy. 
In contrast, the “negative media coverage on cohesion policy” is affected by the EU funds’ “absorption 
gap”, the number of “irregular projects” and the “actual average project quality”. Regarding the projects’ 
quality, when it is low, the negative news on European Cohesion Policy is increased. In addition, any 
irregularities on the projects completed (a high number of “Refunded and completed projects” raises the 
possibility of the existence of “irregular projects”) augments the negative media coverage. Finally, an 
increased absorption gap, which gets higher when the volume of “Total funds available” is high, can further 
have a negative effect on cohesion policy’s media coverage. Obviously, the “negative media coverage on 
cohesion policy” has a positive impact on the “negative media coverage of the EU on cohesion policy per year”. 
At his point, the vicious	cycle of negative political news should be mentioned. Specifically, a high “negative 
media coverage of the EU on cohesion policy per year” increases the “degree of Eurosceptic local parties” in 
Europe, which in turn raises the journalists’ “political opportunism”. Finally, an increased opportunism 
further causes the growth of negative news on cohesion policy and thus the same cyclical effect begins 
repeatedly, always increasing the participating factors. 
The quantities of the negative and the positive media coverage per year sum to the “total media 
attention coverage of the EU on cohesion policy per year”, which in turn has a positive effect on the “total 
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number of people coming across media coverage of EU on cohesion policy per year”. However, when the 
citizens come across a media coverage on cohesion policy, this fact does not always imply that they actually 
get informed. In fact, the “total number of people informed by media per year” is augmented when there is a 
growth on the “fraction of people impacted per media coverage on the EU role on cohesion policy”. This means 
that only if there is significant impact of the news on the citizens (which is high when the “journalist EU 
alphabetization” is high too), they actually get aware of the media message. Finally, the total number of 
citizens that get informed on cohesion policy by the media further add to the final “total citizens getting 
aware of EU role in cohesion policy” rate. 
	
Figure	4.13.	General public awareness system: media stream of information. 
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4.2.6. Funded projects implemented stream of information 
Figure 4.14 illustrates the funded projects implemented stream of information that enhances citizens’ 
awareness about European Cohesion Policy. This stream is divided into four sub-streams concerning the 
citizens’ awareness: (i) after the participation at an ESF program, (ii) after the direct involvement in a 
European Cohesion Policy project, (iii) after informing from the project beneficiaries’ media networks, and 
(iv) after recognising the related label of the ERDF programme on a project sign. In addition, the “word of 
mouth” effect, which is increased when the “interest on EU role in cohesion policy” is high, has an additional 
positive impact on the funded projects implemented stream. 
Beginning from the first sub-stream, an increased number of “Refunded and completed projects” (that 
may also imply a high number of “ESF projects concluded”) raises the “total number of people involved in a 
ESF project”. A high number of people participating at an ESF project, along with a considerable “probability 
a ESF project leader/teacher present EU contribution”, can lead to an increased “total number of people 
involved in ESF project and informed about EU contribution”. However, apart from conveying the EU 
contribution message to the participants, project leaders/teachers should further make it in an effective 
way. Such a high probability (“probability a ESF project leader/teacher present EU contribution and that is 
effective”), along with a great number of participants getting informed about ESF programme, can lead to a 
growth in the “total number of people informed on the EU role in cohesion policy by ESF projects”. 
With respect to the people that have a direct involvement in a regional EU funded programme, a high 
number of “Refunded and completed projects” could increase the “total number of people directly involved in 
EU funded project implementation”. However, not all people involved in the projects are really informed 
about the role and the goals of the EU in the cohesion policy. Therefore, except for a high number of people 
involved in the projects, a high “probability of people involved in the project informed on the EU role in 
cohesion policy” is further required for obtaining a growth of the “total number of people informed on EU role 
in cohesion policy by being directly involved in EU funded projects implementation”. 
Concerning the citizens that get informed through the beneficiaries’ media networks, a high number of 
“Refunded and completed projects” may increase the “total number of beneficiaries displaying EU emblem in 
their media” (that is further augmented by a high “easiness to use EU symbols”). A significant number of 
beneficiaries displaying EU emblem further raises the “total number of people coming across beneficiaries' 
with EU emblem in media per year”. However, not necessarily all the people that have seen the emblem 
translate the contact with the symbol in awareness concerning the role the EU in the cohesion policy. Thus, 
apart from an increased number of people that have observed the EU emblem, an increased “probability 
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people get informed about the EU role in cohesion policy through the emblem in beneficiary media” is further 
required to augment “total number of people informed on the EU role in cohesion policy through the emblem 
in beneficiaries' media”. 
Finally, going through the sub-stream of people that recognise the label of EU funding on an ERDF 
project’s sign, an increased number of “Refunded and completed projects” may imply an increased number 
of “ERDF projects concluded”. ERDF projects are divided into: (i) the projects that have optional 
communication activities (“total number of ERDF project which don't have mandatory communication 
activities”), and (ii) the ones that have mandatory (“total number of ERDF projects which have mandatory 
communication activities”). Therefore, an increase of the total ERDF projects could lead to a growth of both 
categories. Then, an increase of the first category projects may increase the existence of optional 
communication activities (“total number of ERDF projects without mandatory communication activities 
which do them anyway”), while those of the second category obviously raise the existence of mandatory 
communication activities (“total number of ERDF projects with mandatory communication activities 
following the rules”). It should be also mentioned that the optional activities may be enhanced by a higher 
“easiness to use EU symbols”, while the mandatory ones could be fostered by a higher level “monitoring 
capacity”. The number of projects that perform optional and mandatory communication activities sum to 
the “total number of ERDF projects completed with an EU plaque” in order to communicate the EU funding 
contribution. However, only if there is an increased visibility of the plaque the “total number of ERDF 
projects completed with an EU visible plaque” gets augmented (further increased by a high “EU 
recognizability in plaques” which in turn is affected positively by the “monitoring capacity”). Thereafter, if 
many projects have a visible EU plaque, the “total number of people coming across an ERDF project with an 
EU visible plaque informed on EU role in cohesion policy” can be raised, always given an increased probability 
that the plaque provides a meaningful information about EU funding (“probability a plaque informs 
citizens”). Finally, all citizens of the four different sub-streams add to the “total number of people informed 
about EU role in cohesion policy by projects implemented per year”. 
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Figure	4.14. General public awareness system: funded projects implemented stream of information. 
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5. Conclusions 
The presented conceptual map crystallizes the expertise of stakeholders and policy-makers as 
collected through our interviews, focus groups and workshops. In addition, the map capitalizes on the 
empirical studies conducted by the members of the PERCEIVE team. 
While scattered literature is available from the organization perspective of EU management fund, our 
modelling exercise is an attempt at developing an organic view on the system (putting together many 
factors). Obviously, this is just a qualitative model: quantification is necessary to assess how variables of 
interest are affected by several factors all having different weight. The formalization and calibration, which 
is the next step work, will translate the qualitative map into a model to be simulated with a computer in 
order to  support policy-making with sensitivity and scenario analysis.  
However, the qualitative model bring about a number of contributions.  
First, it provides a framework to be used for an in-depth analysis of relevant actors and variables and 
for the rigorous analysis of cause-effect relationships affecting behaviour of interests (absorption of funds, 
quality of investments and awareness of the role of European Union and of cohesion policies in local 
socioeconomic development).  
Second, the qualitative map elicits a number of challenges worth exploring further. 
Absorption rate and analysis of resilience 
Despite emphasis is moving away from the analysis of absorption rates, the analysis of this figure may 
be useful for a number of reasons. Specifically, we suggest, the analysis of the “absorption curve”, that is, 
the time-dependent pattern of yearly absorption along a programming period, may convey a number of 
insights.   First, the dynamic pattern of absorption rates may unveil sources of organizational pressures in 
specific points in time when LMAs need to increase the audience of possible beneficiaries. This may 
generate oscillation in the quality of administration and governance. Second, the features of the longitudinal 
pattern of the absorption rates provides information on the ability of LMAs in distributing their effort along 
the programming period. Third, the change in the features of the pattern across different programming 
periods provide information on how LMAs learn, from one period to the following, to administrate fund 
allocation. This issue is as well connected to the trade-off between learning and flexibility. The higher is the 
difference between competence and skills required from one programming period to the following, the 
lower will be the chance to learn and to shape resilient routines. On the other hand, the flexibility of 
programmes and calls to adapt to emergent needs may require changes in the way calls are administered. 
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This issue speaks to the concept of ambidexterity, which, in organization theory, refers to the ability of 
organizations to both learn from the past and maintain their adaption skills. In addition, this inter-period 
analysis of the curves of absorption highlights the effects on the exogenous factors on the patterns of 
absorption. 
In general, the analysis of the absorption curve reveals how sensitive the management of funds may be 
to exogenous disturbances. This speaks to the relevance of the analysis of the resilience of cohesion policy 
implementation in respect to influences such as: 
1. National or EU policy intervention that accelerate/slow down the formal requisites required. 
2. Support from political administration in term of resource allocation. 
3. Stability of political administration. 
 
 Communication  
One area of intervention that the model highlights concerns the focus and the direction of 
communication policies. Besides traditional, top-down, communication policies, another approach to 
communication would concentrate on building “communities” of stakeholders that, bottom-up, spread 
information and activate word of mouth.  
The beneficiary as well may be a political entity that, for political interest, resists the implementation 
of communication policies. Political interest or negligence may have similar effect. In this context, the 
analysis of the process of monitoring is probably strategic and can be a key part of the model. 
Finally, under an organizational point of view, the model highlights the competition between resource 
allocated to administration and communication. In a further version, it is important to emphasise this trade-
off by modelling the resource stock of personnel, possibly divided into communication and administration 
personnel, and the stock of budget allocated. Here, again, we underline the crucial role of policy-making in 
terms of resource allocation to LMAs. Precisely, the scarcity of resource allocation makes it more difficult to 
manage the communication-administration trade-off thereby hindering the delicate, as well as necessary, 
process of development of communication skills and capacity. 
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5.1. Future directions 
The next step of our research will be the formalization and calibration of our qualitative map. The 
two sub models will pass, first, through a process of refinement through the use of literature and interviews 
with experts3, quantification and validation of the quality of the output.  
With respect to the funds absorption model, the research team will continue deepening the existent 
literature and interviewing field experts. The refinements are expected to consist in minor tuning of the 
underlying structure here presented. Regarding the quantification process, it is going to gather most of our 
attention. First, the structure here discussed is going to be translated in a quantified stock and flow diagram 
and then ‘calibrated’ with real world data.  Data on this system are considered as available to some extent, 
although they appear hard to access and collect at a first look. Much effort will be put in this phase in order 
to contact local managing authorities and other key subjects that might provide useful information.  
After calibrating the model with real world data, the research team is going to compare the resulting 
absorption rate behaviour over time with the real one (reported here in section 3). Being able to replicate 
reality represent an important target, since achieving this goal may provide a first formal validation of the 
quality of the model (Barlas, 1996; Sterman 2000). The aim is to test the model against as many real 
absorption cases as possible give that the more absorption rates it replicates the higher can be the 
confidence in it. It has been planned to extend the range of cases along two different dimensions: space 
(different of regions) and time (different policy cycles). Figure 6.1 below depicts graphically how this phase 
of the work will be structured.  
 
                                                           
3 This process has started already as we presented the qualitative map to an audience of academicians, policy-makers 
and stakeholders at the PERCEIVE Bucharest conference held on the 25-26 of October 2018.  
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Figure	6.1. Funds absorption system: quantification direction. 
The red dotted line shows how ideally this replication phase will unfold, namely being able to replicate 
several policy cycles for many EU regions. However, this is a rather ambitious goal. The minimum objective 
that the PERCEIVE team wants to achieve is to be able to gather data and replicate the absorption rate of a 
policy cycle of one PERCEIVE partners’ region. From then, the team will try to reproduce the behaviour over 
time of the same sample region for another policy cycle, and then move to another region going through the 
same process till time allows (hopefully for all PERCEIVE partner regions).  
In addition to this, many other rigorous validation tests will be undertaken in parallel in order to 
increase the confidence in the model and its outputs, namely: structure and parameter confirmation test, 
dimensional consistency, formal inspections, walkthroughs, extreme conditions tests, behaviour sensitivity 
tests, modified-behaviour predictions (Barlas, 1996; Sterman 2000).  
Regarding the general communication model, the work will slightly differ from the previous one. As 
mentioned, also this structure will be firstly refined. Yet, the system that the model is trying to represent is 
more difficult to formalize than the previous one; beside the presence of many ‘soft variables’ hardly 
amenable to a quantification, there is a general lack of literature (except for the PERCEIVE and COHESIFY 
projects). While for the ‘absorption model’ several ‘hard’ and quantified evidences are available, here these 
latter are lacking because communication related phenomena are generally ‘soft’ and qualitative. These 
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
60 
 
elements make it difficult to root the structure in previous scientific work and makes it necessary to check, 
assess and validate the structure here presented with interviews with experts (and again with previous 
PERCEIVE Working Packages). Once enough confidence on the capability of the model to represent the 
phenomenon under study will be considered satisfactory, a proper quantification will be developed, namely 
a stock and flow diagram built. As said, quantification in this case appears to be much more challenging than 
for the previous system, due to the generic lack of data. However, all the useful information produced in 
previous PERCEIVE Working Packages will be used to feed the stock and flow model. This information will 
constitute the ‘hard nodes’ around which simulation tests will be performed in order to test different 
dynamic hypothesis. Finally, validation test will be performed through the whole quantification process, 
similarly to what has been described for the funds absorption model (Barlas, 1996; Sterman 2000).  
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Appendices 
A. Reference mode data and additional graphs 
Table	A1.	ERDF data during the 2000-2006 period for the regions under study (Source: EU reports). 
Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2003 
Accumulated 
commitments 
100,697,617 € 671,112,000 € 62,135,730 € 
   
866,490,000 € 93,749,166 € 87,896,000 € 
2004 126,996,721 € 859,722,000 € 84,220,990 € 
   
1,099,299,253 € 116,953,176 € 109,236,240 € 
2005 153,937,211 € 1,057,166,000 € 106,319,770 € 
   
1,336,733,905 € 140,565,511 € 130,088,570 € 
2006 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 164,621,351 € 150,155,340 € 
2007 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 164,621,351 € 150,155,340 € 
2008 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 164,621,351 € 150,155,340 € 
2009 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 164,621,351 € 150,155,340 € 
2010 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 164,621,351 € 150,155,340 € 
2011 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 143,343,843 € 
2012 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 143,343,843 € 
2013 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 
   
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 143,343,843 € 
2014 181,519,085 € 1,258,742,000 € 128,033,372 € 322,970,519 € 214,160,713 € 
 
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 143,343,843 € 
2003 
Accumulated 
payments 
72,139,365 € 287,185,276 € 22,705,902 € 
   
458,433,366 € 55,286,428 € 28,649,965 € 
2004 98,027,152 € 415,372,472 € 34,065,461 € 32,380,230 € 21,471,226 € 
 
748,359,183 € 77,622,952 € 53,621,721 € 
2005 115,263,712 € 512,237,517 € 51,410,837 € 59,867,982 € 39,698,266 € 
 
955,236,184 € 110,139,732 € 82,380,268 € 
2006 129,753,030 € 769,575,027 € 86,229,720 € 123,289,970 € 81,753,182 € 
 
1,267,137,371 € 133,701,432 € 104,104,192 € 
2007 150,582,676 € 903,163,836 € 99,981,594 € 219,424,026 € 145,499,366 € 
 
1,267,137,371 € 153,403,263 € 122,460,063 € 
2008 172,443,131 € 1,176,147,168 € 121,631,703 € 304,259,882 € 201,753,750 € 
 
1,402,533,177 € 156,390,283 € 135,270,949 € 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2009 172,443,131 € 1,195,804,900 € 121,631,703 € 307,612,185 € 203,976,651 € 
 
1,443,048,286 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2010 172,443,131 € 1,195,804,900 € 121,631,703 € 307,612,185 € 203,976,651 € 
 
1,500,163,007 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2011 181,519,085 € 1,195,804,900 € 128,033,372 € 307,654,066 € 204,004,422 € 
 
1,500,163,007 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2012 181,519,085 € 1,195,804,900 € 128,033,372 € 322,265,411 € 213,693,158 € 
 
1,513,657,680 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2013 181,519,085 € 1,195,804,900 € 128,033,372 € 322,970,519 € 214,160,713 € 
 
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2014 181,519,085 € 1,195,804,900 € 128,033,372 € 322,970,519 € 214,160,713 € 
 
1,579,118,955 € 156,390,283 € 142,647,573 € 
2003 
Pay rate 
71.64% 42.79% 36.54% 
   
52.91% 58.97% 32.60% 
2004 77.19% 48.31% 40.45% 
   
68.08% 66.37% 49.09% 
2005 74.88% 48.45% 48.35% 
   
71.46% 78.35% 63.33% 
2006 71.48% 61.14% 67.35% 
   
80.24% 81.22% 69.33% 
2007 82.96% 71.75% 78.09% 
   
80.24% 93.19% 81.56% 
2008 95.00% 93.44% 95.00% 
   
88.82% 95.00% 90.09% 
2009 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
   
91.38% 95.00% 95.00% 
2010 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
2011 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
   
95.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2012 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
   
95.85% 100.00% 99.51% 
2013 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2014 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2003 
Absorption 
rate 
39.74% 22.82% 17.73% 
   
29.03% 35.35% 19.99% 
2004 54.00% 33.00% 26.61% 10.03% 10.03% 
 
47.39% 49.63% 37.41% 
2005 63.50% 40.69% 40.15% 18.54% 18.54% 
 
60.49% 70.43% 57.47% 
2006 71.48% 61.14% 67.35% 38.17% 38.17% 
 
80.24% 85.49% 72.63% 
2007 82.96% 71.75% 78.09% 67.94% 67.94% 
 
80.24% 98.09% 85.43% 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2008 95.00% 93.44% 95.00% 94.21% 94.21% 
 
88.82% 100.00% 94.37% 
2009 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 95.24% 95.24% 
 
91.38% 100.00% 99.51% 
2010 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 95.24% 95.24% 
 
95.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2011 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 95.26% 95.26% 
 
95.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2012 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 99.78% 99.78% 
 
95.85% 100.00% 99.51% 
2013 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
2014 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 99.51% 
Table	A2.	ERDF data during the 2007-2013 period for the regions under study (Source: EU reports). 
Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2007 
Accumulated 
commitments 
20,825,461 € 201,649,567 € 17,232,042 € 170,066,906 € 145,309,518 € 
 
212,554,167 € 26,228,196 € 
 
2008 40,739,808 € 407,332,124 € 34,808,725 € 344,116,251 € 294,021,734 € 
 
429,359,417 € 52,980,955 € 
 
2009 59,698,267 € 617,128,334 € 52,736,941 € 522,121,812 € 446,114,242 € 
 
650,500,772 € 80,268,769 € 
 
2010 77,654,636 € 831,120,467 € 71,023,722 € 697,805,240 € 596,222,660 € 
 
876,064,954 € 108,102,340 € 
 
2011 94,561,249 € 1,049,392,444 € 89,676,238 € 877,120,552 € 751,581,932 € 
 
1,106,140,420 € 136,492,582 € 
 
2012 110,368,931 € 1,272,029,861 € 108,701,805 € 1,056,410,894 € 909,150,978 € 
 
1,340,817,395 € 165,450,629 € 
 
2013 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,377 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 194,987,837 € 
 
2014 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,765 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 194,987,837 € 
 
2015 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,765 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 194,987,837 € 
 
2016 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,765 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 194,987,837 € 
 
2017 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,765 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 192,841,556 € 
 
2018 125,026,964 € 1,499,120,026 € 142,733,765 € 1,240,184,092 € 1,070,550,290 € 
 
1,580,187,909 € 192,841,556 € 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2007 
Accumulated 
payments 
2,500,539 € 29,982,401 € 2,562,158 € 24,262,898 € 20,730,841 € 25,086,210 € 31,603,758 € 3,899,757 € 739,965 € 
2008 6,251,348 € 74,956,001 € 6,405,394 € 60,657,244 € 51,827,102 € 62,715,526 € 79,009,395 € 9,749,392 € 1,849,912 € 
2009 16,698,684 € 112,434,002 € 17,740,454 € 198,574,737 € 123,597,450 € 122,827,862 € 223,962,723 € 36,911,731 € 3,118,776 € 
2010 28,691,520 € 210,039,914 € 25,507,847 € 399,971,567 € 310,692,780 € 142,438,930 € 321,448,180 € 62,238,873 € 5,368,497 € 
2011 46,540,014 € 210,039,914 € 43,573,130 € 655,914,838 € 470,402,304 € 198,830,162 € 653,977,093 € 108,817,254 € 7,058,721 € 
2012 53,954,584 € 210,039,914 € 54,410,476 € 849,566,637 € 627,035,930 € 281,325,938 € 966,826,084 € 134,083,994 € 12,665,228 € 
2013 72,985,021 € 210,039,914 € 93,854,812 € 1,013,303,655 € 756,715,920 € 445,128,882 € 1,115,888,170 € 163,207,782 € 12,665,228 € 
2014 107,219,889 € 210,039,914 € 113,555,516 € 1,178,174,887 € 970,696,457 € 691,720,386 € 1,319,691,789 € 183,244,873 € 25,146,996 € 
2015 118,775,616 € 1,049,533,783 € 134,759,130 € 1,178,174,887 € 1,017,022,776 € 825,276,146 € 1,395,015,405 € 185,238,445 € 32,398,553 € 
2016 118,775,616 € 1,351,965,570 € 135,597,077 € 1,178,174,887 € 1,017,022,776 € 1,101,390,802 € 1,460,035,349 € 185,238,445 € 35,148,330 € 
2017 118,775,616 € 1,410,714,105 € 142,733,765 € 1,178,174,887 € 1,017,022,776 € 1,101,390,802 € 1,460,035,349 € 192,841,556 € 35,148,330 € 
2018 120,895,685 € 1,410,714,105 € 142,733,765 € 1,178,174,887 € 1,070,550,290 € 1,101,390,802 € 1,460,035,349 € 192,841,556 € 35,148,330 € 
2007 
Pay rate 
12.01% 14.87% 14.87% 14.27% 14.27% 
 
14.87% 14.87% 
 
2008 15.34% 18.40% 18.40% 17.63% 17.63% 
 
18.40% 18.40% 
 
2009 27.97% 18.22% 33.64% 38.03% 27.71% 
 
34.43% 45.99% 
 
2010 36.95% 25.27% 35.91% 57.32% 52.11% 
 
36.69% 57.57% 
 
2011 49.22% 20.02% 48.59% 74.78% 62.59% 
 
59.12% 79.72% 
 
2012 48.89% 16.51% 50.05% 80.42% 68.97% 
 
72.11% 81.04% 
 
2013 58.38% 14.01% 65.76% 81.71% 70.68% 
 
70.62% 83.70% 
 
2014 85.76% 14.01% 79.56% 95.00% 90.67% 
 
83.51% 93.98% 
 
2015 95.00% 70.01% 94.41% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
88.28% 95.00% 
 
2016 95.00% 90.18% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
92.40% 95.00% 
 
2017 95.00% 94.10% 100.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
92.40% 100.00% 
 
2018 96.70% 94.10% 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
 
92.40% 100.00% 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2007 
Absorption 
rate 
2.00% 2.00% 1.80% 1.96% 1.94% 
 
2.00% 2.02% 
 
2008 5.00% 5.00% 4.49% 4.89% 4.84% 
 
5.00% 5.06% 
 
2009 13.36% 7.50% 12.43% 16.01% 11.55% 
 
14.17% 19.14% 
 
2010 22.95% 14.01% 17.87% 32.25% 29.02% 
 
20.34% 32.27% 
 
2011 37.22% 14.01% 30.53% 52.89% 43.94% 
 
41.39% 56.43% 
 
2012 43.15% 14.01% 38.12% 68.50% 58.57% 
 
61.18% 69.53% 
 
2013 58.38% 14.01% 65.76% 81.71% 70.68% 
 
70.62% 84.63% 
 
2014 85.76% 14.01% 79.56% 95.00% 90.67% 
 
83.51% 95.02% 
 
2015 95.00% 70.01% 94.41% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
88.28% 96.06% 
 
2016 95.00% 90.18% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
92.40% 96.06% 
 
2017 95.00% 94.10% 100.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
 
92.40% 100.00% 
 
2018 96.70% 94.10% 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 
 
92.40% 100.00% 
 
Table	A3.	ESF data during the 2000-2006 period for the regions under study (Source: EU reports). 
Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2003 
Accumulated 
commitments 
31,871,192 € 233,362,000 € 321,993,921 € 
   
210,427,981 € 13,232,866 € 8,016,000 € 
2004 40,191,171 € 294,805,000 € 410,005,106 € 
   
260,455,725 € 18,054,547 € 10,157,510 € 
2005 48,714,151 € 359,197,000 € 499,776,469 € 
   
311,476,231 € 22,935,712 € 12,346,030 € 
2006 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 27,878,649 € 14,575,560 € 
2007 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 27,878,649 € 14,575,560 € 
2008 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 27,878,649 € 14,575,560 € 
2009 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 27,878,649 € 14,575,560 € 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2010 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 26,496,592 € 13,544,840 € 
2011 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2012 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2013 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 
   
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2014 57,440,139 € 424,883,000 € 591,343,315 € 166,872,324 € 151,105,915 € 
 
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2003 
Accumulated 
payments 
22,233,948 € 57,107,253 € 180,108,366 € 
   
158,044,810 € 10,471,970 € 1,601,463 € 
2004 31,195,004 € 93,064,242 € 315,842,831 € 16,722,105 € 15,142,170 € 
 
195,646,425 € 13,165,933 € 4,150,387 € 
2005 38,690,910 € 93,064,242 € 395,044,512 € 31,019,766 € 28,088,961 € 
 
245,664,810 € 19,028,450 € 5,788,871 € 
2006 44,815,300 € 93,064,242 € 436,214,038 € 55,664,848 € 50,405,530 € 
 
268,799,473 € 22,721,750 € 10,046,516 € 
2007 48,489,455 € 93,064,242 € 516,356,363 € 121,692,583 € 110,194,841 € 
 
345,394,350 € 25,475,190 € 11,159,482 € 
2008 54,568,132 € 93,064,242 € 561,776,149 € 153,146,553 € 138,676,981 € 
 
345,394,350 € 26,484,717 € 12,844,126 € 
2009 54,568,132 € 269,392,986 € 561,776,149 € 158,859,999 € 143,850,610 € 
 
345,394,350 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2010 57,219,393 € 269,392,986 € 561,776,149 € 158,859,999 € 143,850,610 € 
 
345,394,350 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2011 57,219,393 € 269,392,986 € 591,343,315 € 161,203,240 € 145,972,457 € 
 
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2012 57,219,393 € 269,392,986 € 591,343,315 € 166,844,137 € 151,080,392 € 
 
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2013 57,219,393 € 269,392,986 € 591,343,315 € 166,872,324 € 151,105,915 € 
 
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2014 57,219,393 € 306,827,119 € 591,343,315 € 166,872,324 € 151,105,915 € 
 
363,573,000 € 26,484,717 € 13,544,840 € 
2003 
Pay rate 
69.76% 24.47% 55.94% 
   
75.11% 79.14% 19.98% 
2004 77.62% 31.57% 77.03% 
   
75.12% 72.92% 40.86% 
2005 79.42% 25.91% 79.04% 
   
78.87% 82.96% 46.89% 
2006 78.02% 21.90% 73.77% 
   
73.93% 81.50% 68.93% 
2007 84.42% 21.90% 87.32% 
   
95.00% 91.38% 76.56% 
2008 95.00% 21.90% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 95.00% 88.12% 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2009 95.00% 63.40% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 95.00% 92.93% 
2010 99.62% 63.40% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 99.96% 100.00% 
2011 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2012 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2013 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2014 99.62% 72.21% 100.00% 
   
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2003 
Absorption 
rate 
38.71% 13.44% 30.46% 
   
43.47% 39.54% 11.82% 
2004 54.31% 21.90% 53.41% 10.02% 10.02% 
 
53.81% 49.71% 30.64% 
2005 67.36% 21.90% 66.80% 18.59% 18.59% 
 
67.57% 71.85% 42.74% 
2006 78.02% 21.90% 73.77% 33.36% 33.36% 
 
73.93% 85.79% 74.17% 
2007 84.42% 21.90% 87.32% 72.93% 72.93% 
 
95.00% 96.19% 82.39% 
2008 95.00% 21.90% 95.00% 91.77% 91.77% 
 
95.00% 100.00% 94.83% 
2009 95.00% 63.40% 95.00% 95.20% 95.20% 
 
95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2010 99.62% 63.40% 95.00% 95.20% 95.20% 
 
95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2011 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 96.60% 96.60% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2012 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 99.98% 99.98% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2013 99.62% 63.40% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2014 99.62% 72.21% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table	A4.	ESF data during the 2007-2013 period for the regions under study (Source: EU reports). 
Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2007 8,684,843 € 57,873,685 € 39,806,017 € 
   
33,639,530 € 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2008 
Accumulated 
commitment
s 
16,989,724 € 116,904,845 € 80,408,154 € 
   
67,951,850 € 
  
2009 24,895,971 € 177,116,627 € 121,822,334 € 
   
102,950,417 € 
  
2010 32,384,316 € 238,532,645 € 164,064,798 € 
   
138,648,955 € 
  
2011 39,434,881 € 301,176,983 € 207,152,112 € 
   
175,061,464 € 
  
2012 46,027,160 € 365,074,208 € 251,101,171 € 
   
212,202,223 € 
  
2013 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 
   
283,515,056 € 
  
2014 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 
   
283,515,056 € 
  
2015 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 
   
283,515,056 € 
  
2016 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 
   
283,515,056 € 
  
2017 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 
   
283,515,056 € 
  
2018 52,140,000 € 430,249,377 € 313,496,873 € 826,482,944 € 1,766,718,347 € 467,485,074 € 283,515,056 € 79,518,747 € 
 
2007 
Accumulated 
payments 
1,042,800 € 8,604,988 € 5,918,584 € 16,877,652 € 35,840,916 € 10,917,500 € 5,001,716 € 1,657,338 € 1,249,582 € 
2008 2,607,000 € 21,512,469 € 14,796,461 € 42,194,130 € 89,602,292 € 27,293,750 € 12,504,290 € 4,143,345 € 3,123,954 € 
2009 13,513,935 € 59,329,905 € 50,909,929 € 124,042,722 € 213,370,252 € 49,353,456 € 54,773,687 € 11,752,546 € 12,196,997 € 
2010 20,921,635 € 59,329,905 € 92,348,537 € 208,083,070 € 462,417,308 € 74,732,133 € 73,772,968 € 21,640,949 € 23,083,787 € 
2011 28,132,518 € 59,329,905 € 157,039,820 € 349,949,697 € 727,656,044 € 101,963,156 € 135,571,282 € 37,086,259 € 27,576,475 € 
2012 36,007,702 € 156,368,480 € 188,407,237 € 494,032,337 € 997,982,252 € 118,389,210 € 182,136,053 € 37,086,259 € 38,421,691 € 
2013 44,442,726 € 266,472,454 € 228,289,970 € 625,570,403 € 1,276,943,052 € 223,789,724 € 216,978,384 € 49,200,390 € 38,421,691 € 
2014 49,533,000 € 288,502,959 € 266,000,409 € 758,766,675 € 1,639,384,140 € 241,246,270 € 242,961,402 € 74,514,118 € 44,327,017 € 
2015 49,533,000 € 288,502,959 € 297,822,029 € 826,482,944 € 1,759,838,092 € 349,952,405 € 269,339,303 € 78,723,560 € 55,048,316 € 
2016 49,533,000 € 288,502,959 € 297,822,029 € 826,482,944 € 1,766,718,347 € 444,110,820 € 269,339,303 € 78,723,560 € 59,285,828 € 
2017 49,533,000 € 288,502,959 € 297,822,029 € 826,482,944 € 1,766,718,347 € 444,110,820 € 283,515,056 € 78,723,560 € 59,285,828 € 
2018 52,140,000 € 288,502,959 € 297,822,029 € 826,482,944 € 1,766,718,347 € 444,110,820 € 283,515,056 € 78,723,560 € 59,285,828 € 
2007 Pay rate 12.01% 14.87% 14.87% 
   
14.87% 
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Year	 Data	type	
Burgenland	
(AT)	
Calabria	(IT)	
Emilia	
Romagna	(IT)	
Dolnośląskie	
(PL)	
Warmińsko-
mazurskie	
(PL)	
Sud-Est	(RO)	
Extremadura	
(ES)	
Norra	
Mellansverige	
(SE)	
Essex	(UK)	
2008 15.34% 18.40% 18.40% 
   
18.40% 
  
2009 54.28% 33.50% 41.79% 
   
53.20% 
  
2010 64.60% 24.87% 56.29% 
   
53.21% 
  
2011 71.34% 19.70% 75.81% 
   
77.44% 
  
2012 78.23% 42.83% 75.03% 
   
85.83% 
  
2013 85.24% 61.93% 72.82% 
   
76.53% 
  
2014 95.00% 67.05% 84.85% 
   
85.70% 
  
2015 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 
  
2016 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 
   
95.00% 
  
2017 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 
   
100.00% 
  
2018 100.00% 67.05% 95.00% 
   
100.00% 
  
2007 
Absorption 
rate 
2.00% 2.00% 1.89% 2.04% 2.03% 2.34% 1.76% 2.08% 
 
2008 5.00% 5.00% 4.72% 5.11% 5.07% 5.84% 4.41% 5.21% 
 
2009 25.92% 13.79% 16.24% 15.01% 12.08% 10.56% 19.32% 14.78% 
 
2010 40.13% 13.79% 29.46% 25.82% 26.17% 15.99% 26.02% 27.21% 
 
2011 53.96% 13.79% 50.09% 42.34% 41.19% 21.81% 47.82% 46.64% 
 
2012 69.06% 36.34% 60.10% 59.78% 56.49% 25.32% 64.24% 46.64% 
 
2013 85.24% 61.93% 72.82% 75.69% 72.28% 47.87% 76.53% 61.87% 
 
2014 95.00% 67.05% 84.85% 91.81% 92.79% 51.61% 85.70% 93.71% 
 
2015 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 100.00% 99.61% 74.86% 95.00% 99.00% 
 
2016 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 95.00% 95.00% 99.00% 
 
2017 95.00% 67.05% 95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 99.00% 
 
2018 100.00% 67.05% 95.00% 100.00% 100.00% 95.00% 100.00% 99.00% 
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Figure	A1.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Burgenland, Austria (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A2.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Dolnośląskie, Poland (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 	
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Figure	 A3.	 Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
Poland (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A4.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Extremadura, Spain (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	 A5.	 Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Norra Mellansverige, 
Sweden (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A6.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Burgenland, Austria (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A7.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Dolnośląskie, Poland (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports). 	
	
	
Figure	A8.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Warmińsko-mazurskie, Poland 
(Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A9.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Extremadura, Spain (Own 
elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A10.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Norra Mellansverige, Sweden 
(Own elaboration based on EU reports). 
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Figure	A11.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Burgenland, Austria, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A12.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Dolnośląskie, Poland, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A13.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
Poland, with programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A14.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Extremadura, Spain, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A15.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Norra Mellasverige, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	A16.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Burgenland, Austria, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A17.	Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Dolnośląskie, Poland, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
	
Figure	 A18.	 Comparison of absorption rates for ESF fund in Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
Poland, with programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
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Figure	A19.	Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Extremadura, Spain, with 
programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).	
	
Figure	 A20.	 Comparison of absorption rates for ERDF fund in Norra Mellasverige, 
Sweden, with programming period overlap (Own elaboration based on EU reports).
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Table	A5. European citizens awareness on regional EU funded projects (Source: Eurobarometers). 
Year	 Country	 Positive	response	 Question	
1992 
EU12 22.0% 
EU provides a regional development fund (ERDF) to help less developed UE regions. Do you know 
any activity of this EU regional development fund (ERDF) in your country? 
Austria Not member 
Italy 16.0% 
Poland Not member 
Romania Not member 
Spain 32.0% 
Sweden Not member 
United Kingdom 28.0% 
1995 
EU15 28.0% 
Austria 37.0% 
Italy 18.0% 
Poland Not member 
Romania Not member 
Spain 26.0% 
Sweden 23.0% 
United Kingdom 42.0% 
2008 
EU27 48.9% 
Europe supports its regions and cities through EU Regional Policy. Are you aware that your city or 
region receives support from the EU  
Regional Policy? 
Austria 64.3% 
Italy 56.1% 
Poland 65.0% 
Romania 60.6% 
Spain 61.5% 
Sweden 23.5% 
United Kingdom 37.9% 
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Year	 Country	 Positive	response	 Question	
2010 
EU27 33.8% 
Europe provides financial support in regions and cities. Have you heard about EU co-financed 
projects to improve the area you live in? 
Austria 21.5% 
Italy 33.4% 
Poland 68.5% 
Romania 64.2% 
Spain 43.4% 
Sweden 27.7% 
United Kingdom 13.3% 
2013 
EU28 34.0% 
Austria 16.0% 
Italy 48.0% 
Poland 80.0% 
Romania 46.0% 
Spain 33.0% 
Sweden 23.0% 
United Kingdom 10.0% 
2015 
EU28 34.0% 
Austria 17.0% 
Italy 43.0% 
Poland 76.0% 
Romania 45.0% 
Spain 28.0% 
Sweden 21.0% 
United Kingdom 9.0% 
2017 EU28 35.0% 
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Year	 Country	 Positive	response	 Question	
Austria 16.0% 
Italy 40.0% 
Poland 80.0% 
Romania 44.0% 
Spain 30.0% 
Sweden 22.0% 
United Kingdom 18.0% 
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B. Causal relationships 
Table	B1. Causal relationships: funds absorption system. 
Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
date of EU policy cycle 
regulation approval 
ROP development time 
An increase in C1 date 
increases C2 time 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007) 
national-EU 
partnership 
agreement delay 
ROP development time 
An increase in C1 delay 
increases C2 time 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007) 
ROP development 
time 
time to allocate funds at EU level 
An increase in C1 time 
increases C2 time 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007) 
ROP approval time time to allocate funds at EU level 
An increase in C1 time 
increases C2 time 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007) 
time to allocate funds 
at EU level 
EU funds 
An increase of C1 time 
decreases the C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007) 
EU funds Total funds available 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018;  Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
payments to 
beneficiaries 
Total funds available 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
refunding rate payments to beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
Total funds available EU funds allocation at local level 
An increase of C1 state 
increases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
EU funds allocation at 
local level 
Region calls for EU fund 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
applications rate Region calls for EU fund 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
applications rate Projects submitted 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
evaluation rate Projects submitted 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
evaluation rate Projects accepted 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
side projects' rate Projects accepted 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with 
Pierre Reverberi and 
Valentina Aiello (Perceive 
Experts at Università di 
Bologna) 11-06-2018; 
Corte dei Conti, (2017) 
contracting rate Projects accepted 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
PERCEIVE D6.1: ‘REPORT ON CAUSAL QUALITATIVE MODEL’ 
 
86 
 
Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
contracting rate Signed and approved projects 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
utilization and 
realization rate 
Signed and approved projects 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
utilization and 
realization rate 
Projects completed under control 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018 
monitoring rate Projects completed under control 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018 
monitoring rate Projects awaiting to be refunded 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018 
refunding rate Projects awaiting to be refunded 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
refunding rate Refunded and completed projects 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 state 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
time to prepare call EU funds allocation at local level 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018 
submission time applications rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė 
(2013) 
evaluation time evaluation rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow Berică (2010) 
contracting time contracting rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; European 
Commission (2018c); 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government (2015) 
utilization and 
realization time 
utilization and realization rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
George (2008); Squinzi 
(2013) 
bureaucratic 
requirements time 
utilization and realization rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Smętkowski et 
al. (2018) 
monitoring time monitoring rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Burja and Jeler 
(2018) 
time to get refunded refunding rate 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 rate 
Main flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(Private consultant) 17-04-
2018; Berică (2010); 
George (2008); Jaliu and 
Rǎdulescu (2012) 
call quality and 
support 
submission time 
An increase in C1 quality 
decreases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(Private consultant) 17-04-
2018; Barbiero et al. 
(2017) 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
ROP quality call quality and support 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 quality 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Milio (2007); Squinzi 
(2013) 
regional political 
suitability 
ROP quality 
An increase in C1 suitability 
increases C2 quality 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Milio (2007); 
Squinzi (2013) 
regional political 
suitability 
local managing authority 
administrative capacity 
An increase in C1 suitability 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Interview 
with P.M. Reverberi and V. 
Aiello (Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; George (2008); 
Milio (2007); Smętkowski 
et al. (2018); Tatar (2010); 
Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 
(2012); Lucian (2014); RAI 
RADIO RAI 1 "Radio 
anch'io" 27-06-2018 
"Decreto dignità, lavoro, 
fondi europei" 
institutions quality 
local managing authority 
administrative capacity 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Smętkowski et al. (2018); 
Charron and Lapuente 
(2013); Capello and 
Perucca, G. (2017) 
staff capacity 
local managing authority 
administrative capacity 
An increase in C1 capacity 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Berică (2010); 
Hapenciuc et al. (2013); 
Jaliu and Rǎdulescu (2012); 
Lucian (2014); Milio 
(2007); Sumpíková et al. 
(2004); Tatar (2010)  
staff number staff capacity 
An increase in C1 number 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018 
equipment availability staff capacity 
An increase in C1 availability 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018 
local managing 
authority skills 
learning 
staff capacity 
An increase in C1 learning 
increases C2 capacity 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Berică (2010); Hapenciuc 
et al. (2013); Jaliu and 
Rǎdulescu (2012); Lucian 
(2014); Sumpíková et al. 
(2004); Tatar (2010)  
Refunded and 
completed projects 
local managing authority skills 
learning 
An increase in C1 capacity 
increases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Hapenciuc et al. 
(2013); Jaliu and Rǎdulescu 
(2012); Lucian (2014) 
local managing 
authority 
administrative 
capacity 
call quality and support 
An increase in C1 capacity 
increases C2 quality 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(private consultant) 17-04-
2018); Barbiero et al. 
(2017) 
local managing 
authority 
administrative 
capacity 
time to prepare call 
An increase in C1 capacity 
decreases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018;  Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018 
local managing 
authority 
administrative 
capacity 
evaluation time 
An increase in C1 capacity 
decreases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018;  Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Berică (2010) 
local managing 
authority 
administrative 
capacity 
contracting time 
An increase in C1 capacity 
decreases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018;  
local managing 
authority 
administrative 
capacity 
monitoring time 
An increase in C1 capacity 
decreases C2 time 
Administrative 
capacity flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Burja and Jeler 
(2018)  
Total funds available absorption rate 
An increase in C1 funds 
decreases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Tatar (2010); Zaman and 
Cristea (2011) 
Refunded and 
completed projects 
absorption rate 
An increase in C1 projects 
increases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Tatar (2010); Zaman and 
Cristea (2011) 
absorption rate absorption rate gap 
An increase in C1 rate 
decreases C2 gap 
Absorption 
rate flow 
 Mathematical logical 
function 
ideal absorption rate 
gap 
absorption rate gap 
An increase in C1 gap 
decreases C2 gap 
Absorption 
rate flow 
 Katsarova, 2013 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
absorption rate gap standards for project quality 
An increase in C1 gap 
decreases C2 standards 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Burja and Jeler 
(2018); Jurevičienė and 
Pileckaitė (2013) 
standards for project 
quality 
acceptance rate 
An increase in C1 standards 
decreases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Burja and Jeler 
(2018); Jurevičienė and 
Pileckaitė (2013); Zaman 
and Cristea (2011) 
average project 
application quality 
acceptance rate 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(Private consultant) 17-04-
2018); George (2008) 
acceptance rate evaluation rate 
An increase in C1 rate 
increases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Zaman and Cristea (2011) 
absorption rate gap 'side projects' rate 
An increase in C1 gap 
increases C2 rate 
Absorption 
rate flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Interview with 
G. Chiellino (Sole24Ore 
journalist and Perceive 
Advisory Board) 25-06-
2018; Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Corte dei Conti 
(2017) 
standards for project 
quality 
actual average project quality 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 quality 
Project quality 
flow 
Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Corte dei Conti 
(2017) 
average project 
quality 
actual average project quality 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 quality 
Project quality 
flow 
Interview with P.M. 
Reverberi and V. Aiello 
(Perceive Experts at 
Università di Bologna) 11-
06-2018; Cottone (2018, 
Video in “Il Sole 24 Ore” 
Journal) 
average project 
quality 
average project application 
quality 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 quality 
Project quality 
flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(Private consultant) 17-04-
2018; George (2008) 
institutions quality 
average project application 
quality 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 quality 
Project quality 
flow 
George (2008); Jaliu and 
Rǎdulescu (2012); RAI 
RADIO RAI 1 "Radio 
anch'io" 27-06-2018 
"Decreto dignità, lavoro, 
fondi europei" 
intermediary 
consultancy 
companies 
average project application 
quality 
An increase in C1 companies 
increases C2 quality 
Project quality 
flow 
Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė 
(2013) 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
Refunded and 
completed projects 
beneficiaries word of mouth 
An increase in C1 state 
increases C2 quantity 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(private consultant) 17-04-
2018 
beneficiaries word of 
mouth 
probability of knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 probability 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(private consultant) 17-04-
2018 
media coverage of EU 
funding opportunities 
probability of knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 probability 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Barbiero et al. (2017); 
Region of Emilia-Romagna 
(2012); Region of Emilia-
Romagna (2014) 
region communication 
mix of EU funds 
probability of knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 probability 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Region of Emilia-Romagna 
(2012); Barbiero et al. 
(2017); Borz et al. (2018); 
Capello and Perucca 
(2017); University of 
Bologna (PERCEIVE). 
(2017); European 
Commission (2014) 
intermediary 
consultancy 
companies 
probability of knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 probability 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė 
(2013) 
local stakeholders 
umbrella 
organizations 
contribution 
probability of knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 probability 
Knowledge 
probability 
flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; Region of 
Emilia-Romagna (2012); 
RAI RADIO RAI 1 "Radio 
anch'io" 27-06-2018 
"Decreto dignità, lavoro, 
fondi europei" 
public potential 
beneficiaries 
interinstitutional coordinated 
potential beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
beneficiaries 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
George (2008) 
public potential 
beneficiaries 
public-private potential 
partnerships 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
partnerships 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
George (2008); Squinzi 
(2013) 
private potential 
beneficiaries 
public-private potential 
partnerships 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
partnerships 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
George (2008); Squinzi 
(2013) 
public potential 
beneficiaries 
total potential beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
beneficiaries 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
Jaliu and Rǎdulescu (2012) 
Interinstitutional 
coordinated potential 
beneficiaries 
total potential beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
beneficiaries 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
Jaliu and Rǎdulescu (2012) 
private potential 
beneficiaries 
total potential beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
beneficiaries 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(private consultant) 17-04-
2018; Squinzi (2013) 
public-private 
potential partnerships 
total potential beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
partnerships increases C2 
beneficiaries 
Potential 
beneficiaries 
flow 
George (2008); Squinzi 
(2013) 
call quality and 
support 
probability a beneficiary is 
interested in the call 
An increase in C1 quality 
increases C2 probability 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Barbiero et al. (2017); 
Milio (2007); Tatar (2010) 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
local stakeholders 
umbrella 
organizations 
contribution 
probability a beneficiary is 
interested in the call 
An increase in C1 
contribution increases C2 
probability 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with D. Ferrara 
(Regione Emilia-Romagna) 
10-7-2018; RAI RADIO RAI 
1 "Radio anch'io" 27-06-
2018 "Decreto dignità, 
lavoro, fondi europei" 
total potential 
beneficiaries 
total potential projects 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 
beneficiaries increases C2 
applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Region of Emilia-Romagna 
(2012); Zaman and Cristea 
(2011) 
probability a 
beneficiary is 
interested in the call 
total potential projects 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries 
An increase in C1 probability 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Barbiero et al. (2017); 
Milio (2007); Tatar (2010) 
total potential 
projects applications 
per call of interested 
beneficiaries 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunity 
An increase in C1 applications 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Barbiero et al. (2017) 
probability of 
knowledge of EU 
funding opportunities 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunity 
An increase in C1 probability 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Interview 
with B. Sartore (private 
consultant) 17-04-2018; 
Barbiero et al. (2017) 
call bureaucracy 
involved 
cost of making an application for 
EU funds 
An increase in C1 quantity 
increases C2 costs 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Interview 
with B. Sartore (private 
consultant) 17-04-2018); 
Smętkowski et al. (2018) 
beneficiary staff 
capacity 
cost of making an application for 
EU funds 
An increase in C1 capacity 
decreases C2 costs 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Tatar (2010) 
total potential project 
applications per call of 
interested 
beneficiaries aware of 
the EU funding 
opportunity 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply 
An increase in C1 applications 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Interview 
with B. Sartore (private 
consultant) 17-04-2018; 
Barbiero et al. (2017) 
cost of making an 
application for EU 
funds 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply 
An increase in C1 costs 
decreases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with G. Chiellino 
(Sole24Ore journalist and 
Perceive Advisory Board) 
25-06-2018; Interview 
with B. Sartore (private 
consultant) 17-04-2018; 
Tatar (2010) 
total potential project 
applications per call of 
interested 
beneficiaries aware of 
the EU funding 
opportunities who 
find convenient to 
apply 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply and who are 
able to co-finance 
An increase in C1 applications 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Berică (2010); George 
(2008); Jurevičienė and 
Pileckaitė (2013); Zaman 
and Cristea (2011); 
Sumpíková et al. (2004); 
Tatar (2010); University of 
Bologna (2017); RAI RADIO 
RAI 1 "Radio anch'io" 27-
06-2018 "Decreto dignità, 
lavoro, fondi europei" 
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Concept	1	(C1)	 Concept	2	(C2)	 Notes	
Type	of	
connection	
Source	
project co-finance 
percentage 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply and who are 
able to co-finance 
An increase in C1 percentage 
decreases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Berică (2010); George 
(2008); Jurevičienė and 
Pileckaitė (2013); Zaman 
and Cristea (2011); 
Sumpíková et al. (2004); 
Tatar (2010); University of 
Bologna (2017); RAI RADIO 
RAI 1 "Radio anch'io" 27-
06-2018 "Decreto dignità, 
lavoro, fondi europei" 
total potential project 
applications per call of 
interested 
beneficiaries aware of 
the EU funding 
opportunities who 
find convenient to 
apply and who are 
able to co-finance 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply, who are able 
to co-finance and who are not 
discouraged by delays in 
refunding 
An increase in C1 applications 
increases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Berică (2010); George 
(2008); Jurevičienė and 
Pileckaitė (2013); Zaman 
and Cristea (2011); 
Sumpíková et al. (2004); 
Tatar (2010); University of 
Bologna (2017); RAI RADIO 
RAI 1 "Radio anch'io" 27-
06-2018 "Decreto dignità, 
lavoro, fondi europei" 
time to get refunded 
total potential project 
applications per call of interested 
beneficiaries aware of the EU 
funding opportunities who find 
convenient to apply, who are able 
to co-finance and who are not 
discouraged by delays in 
refunding 
An increase in C1 time 
decreases C2 applications 
Potential 
applications 
flow 
Interview with B. Sartore 
(private consultant) 17-04-
2018; Jaliu and Rǎdulescu 
(2012) 
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